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Performance auditing gained increasing prominence all around the world and led to the 
expansion of the auditors’ role from “watchdog” to advisory. By accurate performance of their 
new roles, auditors can ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector and, therefore, 
contribute to the fight against corruption. However, in contrast with developed countries, in 
Ukraine, the performance auditing and new roles of auditors are still far to be implemented in 
practice.  
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the existing literature on public sector auditing 
with a thesis on the roles of public sector auditors in Ukraine. In particular, the thesis answers 
the question of what the role of public sector auditors is and how public sector auditors could 
prevent and reduce corruption. To explain empirical findings, the role theory proposed by Kahn 
et al. (1964) and Katz & Kahn (1978) is adopted. The role theory is used in order to understand 
the impact of the public sector auditing on corruption. 
Results of this study are contrary to the expectations and assumptions of the public sector 
literature. An analysis of 15 in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted with experienced 
public sector auditors working in Ukrainian central government and related documents 
indicates that traditional role as a “watchdog” is still present in Ukraine, notwithstanding the 
number of reforms. Research also shows that public sector auditors in Ukraine are experiencing 
the role stress in the form of the role conflict. Different expectations are placed on the auditors 
due to the general lack of understanding of the role of the public sector auditors. Auditors are 
not able to enact the advisory role due to the number of factors, such as role stress, 
organisational environment, skills and competencies, number of staff and lack of independence. 
Research identified that role behavior of public sector auditors affects how effectively 
institution can combat or reduce corruption. Auditors are able to prevent and reduce corruption 
not only by identifying the “red flags”, but also by building integrity, spreading an anti-
corruption culture and sustaining an environment without corruption. The case of Ukrainian 
central government shows that performance auditing tool is not yet used for the fight against 
corruption, as it should. Holding traditional role as “watchdogs”, public sector auditors are not 
able to ensure the effective and efficient public sector.  
With these findings, the thesis has a number of contributions. By showing the state of art of 
the role of public sector auditors in Ukraine, study complements the public sector auditing 
research with the unexplored case of a post-soviet country. This study also sheds lights on the 
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impact of the public sector auditing on corruption in general and performance auditing in 
particular. The analysis also contributes to the discussion on the role theory, by improving the 
understanding of the auditor’s role set and the role stress which auditors may experience. 
Moreover, due to the absence of the real change in roles of the public sector auditors in Ukraine, 
this study may be useful for practitioners to change the perception about auditors in the public 
sector, change the performance auditing into the useful tool and ensure the good governance to 
prevent and reduce corruption.  
Keywords: financial control, public sector auditing, performance auditing, role of auditors, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
New Public Management (NPM) led to the number of changes in the public sector including 
public sector auditing. Dye & Stapenhurst (1998) are calling for the measurement of “achieved 
outcomes” of government programs as a part of performance audits (Barata and Cain, 2001). 
As a result, performance auditing gained an increasing prominence around the globe. Besides 
affecting and contributing to the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of the public sector, 
performance audit can also look beyond finances to assess the performance of government 
against its own objectives or in providing programs and services. The main aim of this type of 
auditing, as one of the mechanisms introduced by the NPM, is in the idea of possible 
improvement of the processes and institutions of public sector. Consequently, the change in 
auditing activities caused change of the auditors’ roles. Previously seen as inspectors or 
“watchdogs”, auditors now have a much wider and influential role. Previous studies show that 
auditors have knowledge and power to promote reforms and help other actors with 
improvements within the government bodies. With the ability of auditors to play a new role of 
helpers, assistants and advisors - they should no further be recognised and limited by the 
function of inspectors.  
Since corruption results from a system’s failure, better institutions or institutional reforms 
are a strong counterstrategy for combating this phenomenon. Better institutions mean making 
systems and structures more effective and efficient, which may be achieved by the 
implementation of a performance audit, which creates a deterrent to corrupt acts (Khan, 2006; 
Otalor & Eiya, 2013). By the accurate performance of their new roles, auditors are able to 
provide good governance and, therefore, contribute to the fight against corruption.  
Performance auditing was well studied in various contexts; however, the emerged roles of 
auditors are lacking research. Furthermore, there is no research on the impact that public sector 
auditors may have on preventing and reducing corruption. The study may be interesting both 
for the business and academic community. The role theory introduced by Kahn et al. (1964) 
and Katz & Kahn (1978) is used for the first time in order to understand the relationship between 
the public sector auditing and corruption. Therefore, the study contributes to the development 
of the role theory and complement the public sector auditing research with the unexplored case 
of a post-soviet country.  
Prolonged negotiations on the potential cooperation between Ukraine and the EU stimulated 
the implementation of international standards, which caused the number of reforms in public 
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sector and in public sector auditing. The main aim of those reforms is seen in increasing the 
demand for performance information due to the possible improvement of organisations which 
it may bring (Tillema, Mimba, & van Helden, 2010). With the adoption of the best practices in 
the Ukrainian public sector, there is an expectation from the international actors that the role of 
auditors might change. However, as evidenced by Torres, Yetano, & Pina (2019),  difficulties 
may occur with real implementation of performance audits, therefore, the change of auditors’ 
role may also be questioned.  
The aim of the study is to illustrate auditors’ perceptions about their current roles in 
Ukrainian central government. Furthermore, this study focuses on the role of public sector 
auditors in preventing and reducing corruption in Ukraine. The results from the present case 
study is relevant, not only for Ukrainian public sector practitioners, but also for a wider 
audience.  
Corruption is the most common occupational fraud schemes in Eastern Europe, moreover, 
transition economies are believed to be among the leaders in terms of corruption. According to 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) released in 2019, Ukraine ranks 126th for the level of 
corruption perception in the public sector out of 180 countries. Anticorruption policies in 
Ukraine showed negative results in the previous year, with the loss of two points, scoring 30 
out of 100 (The Corruption Perceptions Index, 2019; ACFE, 2018). As stated by Thomas de 
Waal (2016: p.1) “the problem is not that a well-functioning state has been corrupted by certain 
illegal practices; rather, those corrupt practices have constituted the rules by which the state 
has been run”.  
Furthermore, corruption represents one of the most significant fraud risks for organisations 
in many industries and regions. Understanding the specific factors involved in corruption 
schemes can help organisations effectively prevent, detect and investigate them (ACFE, 2018: 
p. 13). Public sector audit, therefore, is perceived as one of the tools for effective corruption 
combating. According to IIA (2012), one of the main responsibilities of public sector auditors 
in the public sector organisations they work for is addressing allegations of corruption through 
detection and deterrence. 
 So far, it is unclear what effects the introduction of the performance auditing has had on 
political and democratic processes in Ukrainian public sector. This paper aims to improve our 
understanding of this area based on case research of Ukrainian central government. The 
research present current state of the art of the performance auditing in Ukraine and provide 
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discussion about the roles of auditors. Numerous role senders and expectations arose role 
conflicts and inappropriate role behavior in Ukrainian central government. Our results, thus, 
portray that specific factors such as organisational environment, skills and competencies, 
number of staff and independence are crucial for the performance by auditor of an appropriate 
role. Possible ways of prevention and reduction of corruption, as well as potential obstacles 
auditors can face in the given context are discussed.  
In this regard, the research intends to understand the role of public sector auditors in 
Ukrainian central government and sheds lights on the impact of the public sector auditing on 
corruption. The specific research questions of this study are:  
1. What is the role of public sector auditors in Ukrainian central government? 
2. How public sector auditors could prevent and reduce corruption in Ukraine? 
The empirical findings were collected with the use of documentary analysis and semi-
structured interviews with public sector auditors in Ukraine. Further, they were analysed using 
the role theory. As an example of unexplored post-soviet country with low perception for 
corruption Ukrainian case was chosen (The Corruption Perceptions Index, 2019). Ukraine has 
unstable and developing institutional context, with number of reforms regarding the 
international standards implementation. Therefore, the study on the roles of public sector 
auditors and their possible impact on corruption contribute to the better understanding of the 
effect of reforms in Ukrainian central government and provide both academics and practitioners 
with the information about the systems failures and possible improvements in the public sector. 
In total, fifteen interviews with public sector auditors in Ukraine were undertook.  
Master thesis consists of 7 (seven) chapters. Introduction explains the research topic, the 
motivation of the study, the research method and sources, it also presents some preliminary 
results of the study. Theoretical chapter present studies on performance auditing as well as the 
evolution in roles of public sector auditors and corruption. The role theory proposed by Kahn 
et al. (1964) and Katz & Kahn (1978) is disclosed and described further. Methodological 
chapter provides methods and sources, used in the research process. To get a general 
understanding of the research context, a short overview of public sector auditing in Ukraine is 
made in the next chapter. Research findings are presented in empirical chapter and further 
discussed, with the use of the role theory. The last chapter of the master thesis provides 
conclusions, limitations and suggestions for further research. 
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II.  THEORY 
To become more conscious of the theoretical ambition, the literature review was conducted. 
The literature on performance auditing as well as the evolution in roles of public sector auditors 
are presented first, followed by the studies relating auditing to corruption. As a theoretical 
framework for this research project, the role theory proposed by Kahn et al. (1964) and Katz & 
Kahn (1978) was chosen. Chapter presents the nature of the role theory and its essential 
elements, moreover, its application in the context of public sector auditing is discussed.  
Furthermore, the analytical model of the research is constructed on the basis of the theory to 
provide reader with the understanding of how the chosen theory works in solving the research 
problem of the study.  
 
2.1. Previous literature on the role of auditors: from financial and compliance auditing 
to performance auditing  
Current International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAI) emphasize three 
main forms of public audit: financial, performance and compliance auditing (ISSAI 100). The 
expansion of performance audits gave performance auditing a more direct and active role in 
administrative reform (Pierre et al, 2018). As stated by Power (2005) the auditor of the 1960s 
and 1970s was largely unthinkable of as possible changing agents of public sector reform, this 
role became now more common. The scope of auditing also changed. While financial auditing 
remained important, performance auditing gained increasing prominence (Barzelay, 1997; 
Pollitt & Summa, 1996). 
Due to the NPM reform, a greater attention was drawn to the accountability for results 
(Hood, 1995). Moreover, the increase in scope and cost of public services in the twentieth 
century, turned more attention of the public who demanded guarantees regarding waste, 
inefficiency and financial abuse in the public services. Consequently, public sector auditors 
started to conduct so called performance audits, which is also recognised as “comprehensive”, 
“effectiveness”, “performance”, “systems” and “value-for-money auditing”. The main purpose 
of such audit lies in finding out waste and extravagance and assessing the conduct of 
transactions according to the “vital if elusive” criteria of “efficiency” (Normanton, 1966; 
Gendron et al., 2001). Moreover, the research by Morin (2001) shows that performance audits 
result in long-term improvements for the auditee. 
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Performance auditing, as one of New Public Management (NPM) reforms’ elements, 
(Guthrie & Parker, 1999) has recently received significant research attention. Literature 
includes many valuable studies of the performance auditing around the globe (Tillema & Bogt, 
2010; Pollitt, 2003; Barzelay, 1997; Pollitt & Summa, 1996, etc.). Nevertheless, previously, 
researchers were not considered to be as a vital part of the developments in government 
accounting, therefore, the public sector auditing in general and performance auditing in 
particular are not explored as they should (Hay & Cordery, 2017; Banker, Cooper & Potter, 
1992, p. 508).  
Initially, the audit and interaction between auditor and auditee were not aimed in allowing 
auditors to promote reform, best practice or institutional learning. Performance auditing was 
focusing on the efficiency of individual entities within government. Therefore, it had a narrow 
scope, primary creating a linkage between auditor and auditee (Pierre et al, 2018). Currently, 
researchers claim that public sector auditors have much wider role and are able to make a 
significant contribution to a good governance development (Bunn et Al., 2018; Morin & 
Hazgui, 2016; Heald, 2018; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018). Consequently, auditors 
should not continue to be perceived as “watchdogs”, as stated by Gendron et al. (2001), “the 
state auditor is inescapably an agent of change” (Gendron et al., 2001, p.27). 
A phenomenon of “audit explosion” presented by Power (1994) who evidenced that in 
period from 1980 till 1990, there was a surge in audits in all corners of the public sphere, 
challenging conventional mechanisms of administrative control and accountability. Auditing in 
this perspective was not to ensure prudent spending, but more to find new way of setting 
government’s administrative priorities and strategies, and ultimately a new type of objectives 
of government. According to Power (1994), auditing “must be understood as an idea […] that 
is internal to the ways in which practitioners and policy-makers make sense of what they are 
doing” (Power, 1994, pp. 4-5; italics in original). 
There are a number of studies that represent a clear evidence of the mentioned shift in roles 
of the public sector auditors. For example, Gendron et al. (2001) comparing recommendations 
made by the Office of the Auditor General of Alberta's over time, found that the nature of 
recommendations has significantly changed towards the performance-accountability 
framework. Authors also underlined how complex the work of state auditors is, aiming to 
improve public management. Executive by receiving report as well as recommendations from 
public sector auditors is motivated to adopt changes, either directly or through legislative 
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pressure. The research with similar context, conducted in 6 years after the previous one, have 
provided more information about the role of the public sector auditors. Gendron et al. (2007) 
have showed that state auditors with their strong link to finance and corporate business, 
accountants and auditors are prime movers in the blurring of boundaries between public and 
private sector organisational practices. Therefore, they can also play a crucial role in the 
accomplishment of one of the most pervasive effects of NPM, namely, the alteration of public 
servants’ ways of thinking, talking and acting (Gendron et al., 2007; Oakes et al., 1998; 
Kurunma¨ki, 1999). The role as auditors and as advisory were distinguished in the study. The 
first one provides credibility to performance information disclosed by government and 
departments. The second is used for the improvements in the public sector and the adoption of 
the NPM (Gendron et al., 2007). 
The main purpose of the performance auditing is not just to audit but also to assist the 
audited entity to reform. Auditors now tend to use incentives and advice to shape the behavior 
of the audited entity as impact have become a more important objective. As stated by Pierre et 
al. (2018), “it is a shift from emphasizing means to emphasizing ends” (Pierre et al., 2018: p.4). 
As argued by Leeuw (2009), it is not a question of what programs work, but how management 
can make a program work better, therefore, reinforcing management decisions rather than an 
assessment of policy. As stated by Van Twist et al. (2013) auditors are being able to perform 
the role of “fact-checkers” or “guardians” of the norms in organisations. Therefore, auditors are 
in a sense a “tool of management” (Schillemans et al., 2018). 
The research conducted by Morin & Hazgui (2016) shows that public sector auditors 
strongly believe in their role in improving organisational systems and programs. Therefore, 
auditors want to be perceived by auditees as competent and reliable partners, fully independent 
from political power, who have come to help them improve their operations. Professionalism 
and opportunities that raise due to performance auditing, make auditors consider the assistant 
role as more valuable than the role of guardian. However, simultaneously, the research by 
Morin & Hazgui (2016) raises one more issue to consider, presenting an “obstructive” aspect 
due to the dual identity within the auditee. Desiring to distance themselves from the role of 
“watchdog”, auditors still identify themselves as judges or policemen, both of which wield the 
power to punish. Therefore, authors conclude that “auditors’ advocacy of the assistant role is 
the result of their own self-efficacy expectations” (Morin & Hazgui, 2016: p.17). 
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As argued by Schillemans et al. (2018) audit profession should be transformed into the 
improvers of the government. Major financial crises, have shown that the bookkeeping is not 
enough, “auditing should not only be about accuracy and legitimacy of financial data, but 
should also be about the effectiveness and efficiency of the “machinery of government” and its 
capability to deal with change and improvement” (Schillemans et al., 2018: p. 531). According 
to a recent paper on the worldwide development of the internal audit profession (ACCA, 2014), 
significant changes in and around the public sector requires internal audit to move forward - 
just checking the books is no longer enough. Major financial crises have demonstrated that 
potential of auditing should not be limited only by estimating accuracy and legitimacy of 
financial data - the boundaries of public audit should be widen to the point, where audit would 
be able to proactively contribute to the improvement of government (Schillemans et al., 2018). 
The usefulness of internal auditing has yet to be demonstrated (Archambeault et al., 2008). 
While analysing public sector organisations in Quebeck, Roussy (2013) presented the new 
typology of the roles of internal auditors: a protector role and a helper role. Support of 
organisational performance was found to be the main role performed by internal auditors in 
promoting resource optimization on a regular basis. Internal auditors contribute to improving 
organisational performance by providing support to managers when they feel the need for 
support in coping with the processes for which they are responsible. Thus, internal auditors 
support organisational performance in three ways: by performing performance audits, strategic 
consulting and by taking part in organisational management committees. Therefore, Roussy 
(2013) argues that it is important not to view the internal audit function (IAF) as a governance 
“watchdog” since the roles performed by internal auditors within the IAF are not based on a 
commitment to this principle. 
In this sub-section, presented the literature on performance auditing as well as the evolution 
in roles of public sector auditors, led by the growing interest in performance measurement and 
management as a part of the NPM reform drive (Romzek, 2000). It can be seen that “audit 
explosion” took place in order to strengthen accountability, increase control over public 
borrowing, and improve the quality of public services (Brusca et al., 2018). Performance 
auditing have transformed auditors from “watchdog” or “bookkeeping” into the assistants and 
consultants of the audited institution in reforms. 
It is suggested that performance auditing and emerged roles of auditors require further 
investigation. Few papers in the existing literature focus on the analysis of the effectiveness of 
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performance audits in public entities, and the majority of them are carried out in European 
countries. Examining the reasons why this service might be in more demand in some settings 
than in others and applying the explanations for the performance auditing is considered being 
useful (Hay & Cordery, 2017). Many authors believe that performance auditing has the 
potential to contribute to the quality of political and democratic processes. However, further 
research is needed to find out how this can be achieved. 
 
2.2. Better auditing and financial control as a tool to prevent and combat corruption 
There is a common belief that auditors can play an effective role in preventing and 
combatting corruption (Khan, 2006; Otalor & Eiya, 2013). Although it must be stated that this 
expectation arises from the assumption that the information provided to auditors is reasonably 
accurate, complete and unbiased. Accounting and its actors are one of the main actors in fight 
against corruption, auditing, therefore, is one of the eight pillars of integrity to curb corruption 
(ICAEW, 2002; Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998). 
A review of the literature by Assakaf et al. (2018) shows that there are various studies 
relating auditing to corruption. However, the performance auditing and new roles of auditors 
are rarely addressed in the studies aimed on corruption combatting. The main focus of public 
sector auditing literature are such factors as independence, standards, professionalism and 
auditing input of government auditing agencies, and the effect of these factors on reputations 
and efficiency of government departments. 
Khan (2006) viewed auditing as a tool for reducing and preventing corruption and claimed 
that auditors and this profession in general may play a significant role in reducing corrupt 
frauds. Similarly, Otalor & Eiva (2013) suggested that public sector audit is one of the effective 
mechanisms for combatting corruption and can prevent, if not eliminate, corrupt acts.  
Dipietro (2011) cross country regression analysis on a sample of one hundred thirty 
countries showed that there is a great impact of the higher quality auditing in the public sector 
on demotion of national corruption. Better education of auditors, greater transparency in 
records, the adoption of improved auditing rules by countries and the stigmatization and 
imposition of costs on firms and individuals for not living up to high ethical standards both for 
auditors and auditees – these are just a few of the possible methods that can be employed in the 
fight against corruption from the perspective of improvement of the quality of auditing. 
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Gustavson & Sundström (2016) proposed the concept of “good auditing” which argue that 
good auditing comprises 3 key elements: principle of independence, professionalism and 
recognising the people as the principal. As presented in their study, good public sector auditing 
has a significant impact on domestic levels of corruption, as it is a cornerstone and an essential 
element in fighting corruption in the public sector.  
Some authors emphasize patterns between better (extended) work of the SAI and 
corruption, they concluded that SAIs ensure the decrease in level of corruption and increase in 
efficiency and effectiveness of government institutions (Gherai, Tara & Matica, 2016). As 
stated by Dye & Stapenhurst (1998), SAIs are now moving “from the role of the observer to 
the role of the improver”. 
According to Liu & Lin (2012), audit in the public sector plays a vital role in detecting 
corruption activities. The study presented the number of abnormalities discovered in 
government records via auditing and suggested that there is a direct and positive correlation 
with the corruption level. Furthermore, it is proposed by Bringselius (2018) to expand the scope 
of public audit by adding to the classical three Es' (efficiency, economy and effectiveness) the 
fourth dimension – the ethical audit. Recent studies confirm the existing link between 
transparency, the quality of budgetary management and public audit systems that positively 
affect the perception of corruption (Brusca, Rossi & Aversano, 2017).   
As corruption is normally conceal any trace in the official records, auditors not always have 
an opportunity to reveal it, however, they are able to point out where corruption is possible to 
appear (Khan, 2006). Auditors can help to identify so called “red flags” - indicators or 
symptoms of fraud and investigate them further. Albrecht et al. (2012) defines various forms of 
fraud indicators or “red flags”, among which are accounting anomalies, internal control 
weaknesses, analytical anomalies, extravagant lifestyle, unusual behavior, and tips and 
complaints. 
However, numerous obstacles exist in prevention of corruption, among them are 
administrative chaos, lack of independence, transparency and competencies, weak sanctions 
against corruption and absence political will to listen to auditors’ recommendations and reform 
the public sector (Klitgaard, 2006). IAF is now aimed in monitoring internal control systems, 
therefore, the existence of IAF is an important element in the prevention of corruption. The 
focus of internal auditing on corruption is also important because many of the corruption 
schemes may involve management (Reding et al., 2013; Spira & Page, 2003; Jeppesen, 2019).  
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As stated by Rothstein (2011) revolutionary change in institutions is needed to combat 
corruption. It is argued that if a project was planned in a professional way, it should achieve its 
results if no other factors emerge. Therefore, if resources are significantly exceeded with no 
results achieved, then there is a possibility that the people involved in its management may have 
indulged in corruption. Such indicators of diseconomy and inefficiency in institution operation, 
as well as failure to achieve results and impact can be revealed by a properly organised 
performance audit (Otalor & Eiya, 2013).    
Agbo & Aruomoaghe (2014) argues that now it is time for proper decision making, proper 
utilization of resources, transparency and accountability of the taxpayers’ money. Performance 
auditing closes gaps for corruption to appear and deprive its ability to rapidly occur.  Therefore, 
public sector auditors may detect corruption using benchmarking techniques, inspection of 
assets, public service satisfaction surveys, as well as through establishing whistleblower lines 
(Jeppesen, 2019). Consequently, due to the environment that performance auditing creates, it is 
a useful remedy, however, it is only one of the numerous tools. As stated by della Porta & 
Vannucci (1999) people are following the role model of the majority in organisation, therefore, 
becoming a part of the “corrupt game”. The change in agents’ beliefs about what “all” the other 
agents are likely to do when it comes to corrupt practices is crucial to create an environment 
without corruption (Rothstein, 2011). 
Yet research lack an overall theoretical understanding of how auditing should be organised 
in order to generate lower degrees of public sector corruption (Gustavson & Sundström, 2016). 
As concluded by Assakaf et al. (2018), there is a gap in the empirical studies on corruption in 
developing countries that must deal with real problems of corruption, moreover most of these 
studies have no empirical material.  
Further investigation should be done in order to figure out the relationship between 
performance auditing and corruption; the research will also give an understanding of how public 
sector auditors, performing their new consultative roles brought by NPM, could prevent and 
reduce corruption in public sector.  
Table 2.1. presents the summary of literature on the role of public sector auditors used in 
this thesis. Authors are gathered in 3 categories, those who studied the transition from 
financial/compliance auditing to performance auditing, those who studied the change of roles 
from “watchdog” to advisory and those who studied the role of auditors in detecting, reducing 
and preventing corruption.  
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Table 2.1. The summary of literature on the role of public sector auditors 
Topic Authors 
Transition from financial/compliance 
auditing to performance auditing 
Power, 1994; Hood, 1995; Normanton, 1966; Pollitt 
& Summa, 1996; Barzelay, 1997; Guthrie & Parker, 
1999; Romzek, 2000; Gendron et al., 2001; Morin, 
2001; Pollitt, 2003; Power, 2005; Gendron et al., 
2007; Tillema & Bogt, 2010; Pierre et al, 2018 
Change of roles under NPM reforms 
(from “watchdog” or “bookkeeping” 
to assistants and consultants) 
Oakes et al., 1998; Kurunma¨ki, 1999; Gendron et al., 
2001; Power, 2005; Gendron et al., 2007; Leeuw, 
2009; Roussy, 2013; Morin & Hazgui, 2016; Pierre et 
al., 2018; Bunn et Al., 2018; Heald, 2018; Reichborn-
Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018; Schillemans et al., 2018 
Role in detecting, reducing and 
preventing corruption  
Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998; ICAEW, 2002; Spira & 
Page, 2003; Khan, 2006; Dipietro, 2011; Rothstein, 
2011; Liu & Lin, 2012; Otalor & Eiya, 2013; Reding 
et al., 2013; Agbo & Aruomoaghe, 2014; Gustavson 
& Sundström, 2016; Gherai, Tara & Matica, 2016; 
Brusca, Rossi & Aversano, 2017; Assakaf et al., 2018;  
Bringselius, 2018; Jeppesen, 2019 












2.3. Role theory 
Role theory has an implication in a number of different social sciences. When discussing 
management accounting research, the theory is in a great importance, however, in contrast with 
other theories like institutional and actor-network theory (ANT), role theory has hardly been 
used in accounting studies for the past decades. The following streams of the theory can be 
distinguished: functional role theory, symbolic interactionist role theory, structural role theory, 
organisational role theory and cognitive role theory (Biddle, 1986). 
For the purpose of this study, the theory which was introduced by Kahn et al. (1964) and 
Katz & Kahn (1978) is in focus to explain empirical findings (i.e. organisational role theory) 
(Figure 2.1). Organisational role theory is focused on social systems that are preplanned, task-
oriented and hierarchical. In the previous accounting research, role theory was mainly focused 
on the changes in actors’ position, therefore, presenting the generated problems and new 
expectations and pressures. Consequently, role theory was used to provide us with information 
about the choice of strategies to cope with the emerged situation in which actors may appear or 







Figure 2.1. Role theory illustration  
Source: constructed by the author (based on Kahn et al., 1964; Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
Role theory is used in order to examine the way of how roles of the focal person are enacted 
in organisations. Forces and pressures affecting the role set are also in focus of the theory. As 
stated by Rodham (2010), it is necessary to look not only at “what they do”, but rather “why 
and how do they do what they do”. In other words, it is not enough to be aware of the role 
behavior only, but also about expectations and the way they were transferred to the focal person. 

























senders. Role theory says: the focal person behaves according to the role set received from the 
role sender. The focal persons behavior also depends on the perception (interpretation) of the 
role set and other factors which influence the way that the role is enacted. 
Key starting point of the role set are expectations. Those are evaluative, they set limits and 
requirements for the focal person (Burkert et al., 2011). The study of occupational health 
professionals underwent by Rodham (2000) showed the sensitive position at which focal person 
can appear if expectations are not balanced in reality. This can be described as experience of 
the “Status Triangle Dilemma”, introduced by Gadd (1995). By applying it on study of public 
sector audit, it can be seen that auditors can be pushed in different directions (Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2. Status triangle dilemma 
Source: constructed by the author (based on Gadd, 1995).  
Some external factors, such as organisational characteristics and surrounding conditions, 
have an influence on the role senders expectations. Impersonal factors should also be considered 
as relations between the role sender and focal person can change the role senders attitude 
dramatically (Lynch, 2007; Wickham & Parker, 2007). There are also some factors that affect 
the behavior of the focal role person, those are: personal, organisational and relationship-
related.  
The focal role person enacts some role with the aim of managing a specific situation, both 
the situation and the person’s behavior being governed by context-specific rules. The term 







occupant accepts to carry out (Michael, 2001; Liu et al., 2014). Influenced by different factors 
(e.g. individual attitude, skills and competences and other interpersonal factors), enacting of the 
role may sometimes result in role incompatibility between the role sender and the focal role 
person (Ebimobowei & Kereotu, 2011). Such cause the focal person to experience the role 
stress, which can be in the form of role conflict or role ambiguity. Both conflict and ambiguity 
occur when role sender puts inadequate needs and abilities on the focal person (Fischer, 2010). 
There are four different types of role conflict (Kahn et al., 1964): (1) intra-sender conflict 
(implies incompatible prescriptions and proscriptions from single role sender); (2) inter-sender 
conflict (implies pressures from different role senders); (3) inter-role conflict (appears when 
pressures from different groups of role senders are in conflict); (4) person-role conflict (occurs 
when pressures violate the moral values of the focal person).  
Role ambiguity refers to the discrepancy between the amount of information a person has 
and the amount he or she requires to perform the role adequately, in other words, role ambiguity 
occurs when there is lack of information. It is also argued that even if focal person knows what 
to do, they do not always know how to do it (Kahn et al., 1964). 
There are two responses to the role stress according to Kahn et al. (1964): behavioral coping 
efforts and effective symptom formation. The focal person can pick one response or use them 
in complex. Behavioral coping efforts include attempts of the focal person to correspond 
expectations or if it is not possible – to modify demands. Effective symptom formation leads to 
highly emotional response, which sometimes can be ended in complete individual’s frustration 
and dysfunction of the focal person (Merton, 1949).  
The development of the performance audit expanded the role of auditors. Historically 
limited to financial control, auditors were entitled to carry out the advisory, support, guidance 
roles, etc. Taking multiple roles, those may not be perfectly reconcilable with one another 
(Pollitt, 2003). It is argued by Cullinan & Sutton (2002) and Sikka (2009) that new advisory 
role of auditors may conflict with their role as reviewers of the organisation.  
Internal auditors operate in a complex and ever-changing environment, therefore, the role 
theory developed by Katz & Kahn (1978) is relevant to analyse the roles performed by the 
internal auditors. Ahmad & Taylor (2009, p. 917) emphasized the need for a better 
understanding of the behavior of internal auditors in situations involving role conflict and the 
impact of these behaviors.  
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Roussy (2013) assumed that the legal and regulatory environment will also shape the roles 
of auditors. From a theoretical point of view, the legal and regulatory environment is assimilated 
with norms, which, as noted by Katz & Kahn (1978), reflect the general expectations of a role 
set in a given system. 
 
2.4. Analytical model 
Kaplan (1964) stated that theory is necessary to give sense of the unmeaning and inscrutable 
empirical findings. Hempel (1966) argues that if there were no theory, the analysis and 
classification would be “blind”. Spicer (1992) and Zimmerman (2001) view theory as a helpful 
tool to systematize the findings, as well as structure and discipline the research process (Fischer, 
2010). 
The use of role theory comes with two main advantages. First is that it is limited to the 
application of the performance auditing and auditors’ behavior responses; role theory has an 
explanatory power that will help to answer the second research question. Second advantage, as 
stated by Fischer (2010), is that role systems and accounting systems in organisations have 
striking similarities. Because of those similarities, role theory will help to understand the 
consequences of the performance auditing implication and its connection with corruption.  
According to Fondas & Stewart (1994), theoretical framework provided by the role theory 
is a relevant basis for empirical studies on the work and behavior of individuals aimed at 
defining their roles in a specific context. Role theory examines the interrelations and 
interactions between individuals and a range of personal characteristics.  
According to Denis et al. (2000), role theory can be used to draw a number of conclusions 
about the range of roles performed by several focal persons by helping to identify the personal 
and organisational factors shaping the model of organisational role-taking developed by Katz 
& Kahn (1978). 
Role theory may be useful for highlighting potential conflicts and ambiguities between the 
various roles and for identifying potential areas of freedom created by the organisational context 
(Hales, 1986). These areas of freedom are deemed to facilitate the management of role conflict.  
As a result, this study complements prior public sector accounting research with the 
discussion on the performance auditing. For the first time, role theory is adopted in investigation 
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of new roles of auditors as a result of the performance auditing application in order to 














Figure 2.3. Illustration of how theoretical framework is working 
Source: constructed by the author. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates how role theory will help me to solve the research problem on the 
relationship between public sector auditing and corruption. Firstly, empirical findings will 
provide me with the information about the current state of the roles of public sector auditors. 
Secondly, I will study how new and emerging roles of auditors, brought with the performance 
auditing, could make better auditing in order to prevent and reduce corruption in public sector. 
 











In this chapter, philosophical assumptions, research design, data collection and analysis 
techniques, as well as ethics and quality of the research design are discussed. The research 
project methodology is presented below in form of the research onion (Figure 3.4).  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Illustration of the research project methodology 
Source: constructed by author (based on Saunders et al., 2015). 
 
3.1. Research philosophy   
The term research philosophy refers to a system of beliefs and assumptions about the 
development of knowledge (Saunders et al., 2015). At every stage of the research project, 
researcher make several assumptions (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). These include assumptions 
about human knowledge (epistemological), about the realities encountered in the research 
(ontological) and the extent and ways researcher own values influence her or his research 
process (axiological). These assumptions inevitably shape how researcher understand her or his 
RQs (research questions), make a methodological choice and how the findings will be 















As Alvesson & Sköldberg (2000) stated, researcher needs to develop the reflexivity, to 
become aware of and actively shape the relationship between philosophical position and how 
the research will be undertaken. In terms of developing my own philosophy, I should have 
created a perfect combination of research philosophies, research design and my own beliefs and 
assumptions (Saunders et al., 2015). 
Natural and social scientists generally draw from different ontological and epistemological 
assumptions when developing their methodologies for conducting research. Within the social 
sciences, there have been similar debates, although primarily between the positions of internal 
realism, relativism and nominalism (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). Roles of auditors in 
presenting and reducing corruption can be seen and experienced differently by different people, 
depending on several factors. Thus, by choosing relativist ontology, I am accepting different 
viewpoints and agree that there is no single reality that can somehow be discovered, but there 
are many perspectives on the issue.  
As stated by Easterby-Smith et al. (2015), there is no single philosopher who subscribes to 
all aspects of one particular view. For finding deeper insights, a research mix of two different 
epistemologies is often used by social science studies: positivism and social constructionism 
(other definitions are “interpretivism’’, “constructivism”). 
Positivism is based on the idea of the objective measurement, rather than subjective. The 
world which exist externally and cannot be interfered through sensation, intuition and feelings 
is the main idea of this epistemology (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). 
The idea of social constructionism, as developed by Berger & Luckman (1966), Watzlawick 
(1984) and Shotter (1993), focuses on the ways that people make sense of the world – especially 
through sharing their experiences with others via the medium of language. In the social 
construction position researcher can reveal trends, now laws. The basic premise of interpretive 
paradigm is that social sciences deal with actions and behavior generated by human mind 
(Paterson et al.,2016). It allows the researcher to understand what is happening in a given 
context, rather than just measuring it (Patton, 1990; Klein & Myers, 1999).  
I see my research by linking constructionism with relativist ontology. Thus, the main 
assumption is that there may be many different realities, and hence me as a researcher need to 
gather multiple perspectives and to collect the views and experiences of diverse individuals and 
observers.  
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3.2. Research design  
For a decision on the research design for my research project, I was challenged to make a 
methodological choice, determine the research nature, use one or more research strategies and 
to select an appropriate time horizon. This gave me an opportunity to identify what exactly will 
be observed, and how. 
Qualitative method was chosen to design this research. Qualitative data is gathered in a non-
numeric form. The most common types of qualitative data are accounts of what research 
participants have said or done; for example, interview recordings and transcripts, written notes 
of observations, and images, videos and documents (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). 
Research can be designed to fulfil either an exploratory, descriptive, explanatory or 
evaluative purpose, or some combination of these. In order to choose one, I have questioned 
myself about my main research objectives and have decided to make a combination of two. 
First question of this research aims in studying the role of public sector auditors in Ukrainian 
central government. The description applied here to gain an accurate profile of events, persons 
and situations. To avoid my first part of work from being “too descriptive”, I have also applied 
some elements of explanation. It is also considered as a forerunner to a piece of the further 
explanatory research.  
To discover how public sector auditors could prevent and reduce corruption in Ukraine an 
explanatory study was underwent. The emphasis in explanatory research is to study a situation 
or a problem in order to explain the relationships between variables. In this research, my 
ambition was to explain the relationship between public sector audit and corruption.  
A research strategy may be defined as a plan of how a researcher will go about answering 
her or his research question. It is the methodological link between philosophy and subsequent 
choice of methods to collect and analyse data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Saunders et al. (2015) 
discusses the following possible strategies: experiment, survey, archival and documentary 
research, case study, ethnography, action research, grounded theory and narrative inquiry. 
A case study is an in-depth inquiry into a topic or phenomenon within its real-life setting 
(Yin, 2014). Robson (2002) defines case study as “a strategy for doing research which involves 
an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context 
using multiple sources of evidence”. The “case” in my research refers to public sector auditing 
in Ukraine. Once defined, case study research sets out to understand the dynamics of the topic 
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being studied within its setting or context (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). A 
single case of Ukraine was selected purposively because it provides me with an opportunity to 
observe and analyse a phenomenon that few have considered before, it was also possible for 
me as a researched to collect necessary data.  
While choosing case study, it is fundamental to understand the research context and make 
a general overview of public sector audit in Ukraine. As presented in the following Chapter, 
Ukraine is a country where the possibility to conduct audit in the public sector has been 
considered only in recent years (Bardash, 2010). It has unstable and developing institutional 
context, a number of reforms were undertaken with respect to the international standards 
implementation. The need to transform the role of auditors have increased in relevant scientific 
developments (Nevidomyi, 2016; Pikhotskiy, 2016; Slobodianyk et al., 2019). Having a very 
low level of corruption perception (Ukraine ranks 126th for the level of corruption perception 
in the public sector out of 180 countries), however, public sector audit was scantily discussed 
in terms of its possible impact on corruption prevention and decrease (The Corruption 
Perceptions Index, 2019). 
Therefore, the study on the roles of public sector auditors and their possible impact on 
corruption contribute to the better understanding of the effect of reforms in Ukrainian central 
government and provide both academics and practitioners with the information about the 
systems failures and possible improvements in the public sector.  
This research is cross-sectional, involving the study of a particular phenomenon at a 
particular time. Limits are placed on the time for the study, that is why the research project is 
based on interviews conducted over a short period of time (February-April, 2020).  
As a full-time student I was only able to adopt the role of an external researcher. I was 
challenged to identify organisations within which to conduct my research and to negotiate 
access with those from whom I expected to collect data.  
 
3.3. Data collection 
Due to the method, chosen and presented above, the information was collected in non-
numeric form (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). The study is mainly based on documentary analysis 
and semi-structured interviews with public sector auditors in Ukraine. 
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In order to collect primary data for my research project, non-standardized semi-structured 
interviews with public sector auditors were held. These are often referred to as qualitative 
research interviews, where researcher has a list of themes and possibly some key questions to 
be covered, although their use may vary from interview to interview (Saunders et al., 2015).  
When using semi-structured interviews, the ‘five Ps’ provided by Saunders et al. (2015) 
were useful to remember: prior planning prevents poor performance. Therefore, interview guide 
(Appendix 2) was prepared when literature review was made, and theoretical chapter drafted. 
This gave me an opportunity to gain knowledge about the topic and formulate accurate 
questions. Questions were slightly amended during the interviews to get more information from 
the respondent about the interesting topics that came out. To get a full picture about the public 
sector auditing in Ukraine, both auditors at the ACU and internal auditors at the Ukrainian 
central government were interviewed.  
In total, 15 (fifteen) interviews were conducted (Appendix 3). 5 (five) out of 15 (fifteen) 
interviews were conducted during the physical meetings and recorded. However, due to the 
unstable situation in the world because of the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), starting from 
March 2020, respondents started to cancel agreed meetings. Consequently, the number of 
planned interviews decreased. Nonetheless, it was still possible to collect data distantly as some 
of the respondents were open for a phone discussion or to fill the form with questions. 
While conducting interviews, I have followed some rules for their successful completion. 
First of all, as appearance may affect the perception of the interviewee, I considered wearing a 
similar style of clothing to those to be interviewed. This is a formal style of closing as most of 
interviewed are working at the governmental institutions with obligatory dress-code.  
The interview began with the introduction of myself and brief explanation of the research 
project and my main objectives, further I gained a consent from each participant.  
A participant information sheet with questions attached (see Appendix 1) was send prior to 
the interviews, so all respondents were aware about the information I intended to obtain. In few 
interviews’ respondents were curious about the nature of the research project, so I received 
clarifying questions at the very beginning. I have also assured respondents about the possible 
anonymity to increase the level of confidence in trustworthiness and reduce the possibility of 
interviewee or response bias. 60% of respondents have chosen to stay anonymous. During the 
interview I clarified the correct understanding of terminology and abbreviations, I have also 
tested my understanding by summarising responses provided by the interviewee. 
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For many research questions and objectives, the main advantage of using secondary data is 
the enormous saving in resources, in particular, time and money (Vartanian, 2011). It can also 
aid to understanding and explaining the research problem (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2010) 
Documentary analysis gave me an opportunity to collect the data that is relevant to my research 
project. Secondary data was collected from the following sources: official government 
documents, laws, statistics, central government regulatory documents, etc. Selected Internet 
secondary data gateways and archives are presented in the Annex 5.  
I have analysed secondary data before and after the interviews. This gave me an opportunity 
to be more prepared for the interviews and keep the conversation with respondents going. 
During interview I have received some references to the secondary data and have reinforced 
the empirical findings later. In addition, these secondary data were used to help triangulate 
findings based on other primary data, collected through interviews. 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
Data collection, data analysis and the development and verification of propositions are very 
much an interrelated and interactive set of processes in qualitative research. Analysis is 
undertaken during the collection of data as well as after it (Saunders et al., 2015). I have spent 
time between interviews to carry out a cursory level of analysis, as a part of this I have found it 
extremely helpful to listen to audio-recordings of interviews while returning to the place of 
study. 
The nature of qualitative data is discussed in Section 4.2. Social constructionism indicates 
that partially shared meanings and realities are dependent on people’s interpretation of the 
events that occur around them. Since meanings in qualitative research depend on social 
interaction, qualitative data are likely to be more varied, elastic and complex than quantitative 
data. Analysis and understanding of these data therefore need to be sensitive to these 
characteristics to be meaningful (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). 
The extent to which the researcher is clear about the theory is often portrayed as two 
contrasting approaches to the reasoning to adopt: deductive or inductive. Deductive reasoning 
occurs when the conclusion is derived logically from a set of premises, the conclusion being 
true when all the premises are true. In contrast, in inductive reasoning there is a gap in the logic 
argument between the conclusion and the premises observed, the conclusion being “judged” to 
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be supported by the observations made (Ketokivi & Mantere 2010). I have commenced a 
research project by adopting a deductive approach. It was used to develop the theory of this 
research from reading of the academic literature. Further theory was tested by chosen research 
strategy, which is discussed in Section 4.2. In order to be sure that research questions will be 
answered, and objectives achieved, the data was therefore reanalysed inductively. This revealed 
themes that had not figured prominently in the deductive analysis. A combination of the two 
approaches generated a more convincing answer to the research questions and objectives.  
To prepare data to analysis, the interviews were audio-recorded and subsequently 
transcribed and translated. Already written email interviews also required some time spent on 
transcribing and cleaning. I can characterize this stage of the research project as extremely time-
consuming.  
Primary data received from interviews was analysed and compared on the cross-case basis 
to indicate similarities, differences and links in perceptions of public sector audit in Ukraine. 
To simplify the analysis process and make certain the fact that no important information was 
missed, I have decided to apply one of the analytical aids. Therefore, the interview matrix was 
created at the Excel file. Using this tool, I was able to view all the answers of the respondents 
displayed contemporaneously. As a result, the analytical process was much simplified and 
confidence in no information loss raised.  
Several data sources were used (i.e. interview material and, where necessary, relevant 
documentation), which allowed for data triangulation since I was able to compare the data 
collected in the interviews with the data contained in the various documents used as additional 
data sources (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 2002). According to Patton (2002), comparative 
analysis of interview transcripts and written or electronic documents is a form of triangulation 
based on multiple qualitative data sources. 
 
3.5. Ethics and quality of the research design  
Working with human participants in research project always raises ethical issues. The 
research process is done with respect to the Code of Conduct provisions, without violating any 
ethical standards. As can be seen from the message, send to the respondents in the process of 
search (Appendix 1), it consists information about myself and my research project. At the next 
step I have gotten consent in the form of invitation for conducting the interview. The anonymity 
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option was raised twice with each interviewee, before and after the interview. To ensure 
anonymity, this research will not give a detailed presentation of every interviewee or 
organisation. However, the information required to understand the analysis will be disclosed. 
Before the interview, the consent for audio-recording was questioned. During the interview, 
every respondent was able to stop answering at any point in time he or she felt unconfident or 
inconvenient. Besides, the interviewees were able to comment on the transcribed interviews. 
Reliability refers to the extent to which data collection techniques or analysis procedures 
will yield consistent findings. It can be assessed by posing the following three questions 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008): (1) Will the measures yield the same results on other occasions? 
(2) Will similar observations be reached by other observers? (3) Is there transparency in how 
sense was made from the raw data? 
To ensure reliability, primary data was collected from respondents who are professionals in 
the area of the public sector audit in Ukraine, interviews were repeated with some of the 
respondents. Secondary data was viewed with the same caution as the collected primary one. 
During critical evaluation of the sources, I was choosing information which 1) would enable 
me to answer my RQs (research questions); 2) meets the objectives of the research; 3) benefits 
would be greater than the costs; 4) I have a full access to (Saunders et al., 2015). 
Research validity can be divided into two groups: internal and external. It can be specified 
that “internal validity refers to how the research findings match reality, while external validity 
refers to the extent to which the research findings can be replicated to other environments” 
(Pelissier, 2008). Copies of internal documents were obtained after the interviews with auditees, 
these documents were primarily used to validate some of the answers given by the interviewees. 
According to Patton (2002), the use of more than one data analysis method enables data 






IV. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
This chapter will provide a short overview of Ukrainian government structure, public sector 
auditing and corruption in order to get a clear picture of the research context. A review of the 
state power and of Ukrainian central government are presented first. Status of public sector 
auditing and its historical development are described further. This followed by the overview of 
corrupt practices, anti-corruption institutions and general condition of corruption present in 
Ukraine.   
 
4.1.State power and Ukrainian central government 
Ukraine has a premier-presidential form of government since 2014, under which a 
parliamentary coalition appoints and dismisses the head of the cabinet and its ministers. 
Figure 4.1 shows that state power in Ukraine is exercised in accordance with the principles of 
its division into legislative, executive and judicial branches (Article 6 of the Constitution of 
Ukraine). According to the Constitution of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine is the head of the 
state and acts on its behalf. The sole body of legislative power in Ukraine is the unicameral 
Parliament - the Verkhovna Rada. Judicial branch is represented by the Supreme Court and 








Figure 4.1. State power in Ukraine 
Source: constructed by the author (based on the Constitution of Ukraine). 
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is the highest body in the executive branch, and it 













President of Ukraine 
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The central level powers include ministries, state committees, central bodies of executive power 
(equivalent to state committees) and central bodies with special status. Due to the recent reforms 
in the executive branch, 17 ministries are now active in Ukraine.   
State financial control in Ukraine is an instrument to implement financial policies and 
ensure the formation and effective use of financial resources. First of all, it aims on achieving 
its objectives in the field of finance and to identify deviations from the adopted laws, standards, 
effectiveness and resource management (Miedviedkova, 2016). Public institutions, entitled to 
carry out the state financial control, are also based on the independence principle and deviation 
of legislative and executive powers (parliamentary and governmental control).  
 
4.2.Financial control and public sector auditing in Ukraine  
The chronology of the public sector auditing development (Figure 4.2) represents its 
evolution in Ukraine, which began with the establishment of the Supreme Audit Institution in 
Ukraine (SAI) – the Accounting Chamber (ACU) that further became an active member on both 
the international and European levels (INTOSAI since 1998; EUROSAI since 1999). By joining 
these organisations, ACU became a part of the international exchange of experience between 
the auditors all around the world.  
 
Figure 4.2. Chronology of the public sector auditing development in Ukraine 
Source: constructed by the author.  
Ukrainian public sector audit has been separated from global trends for a long time as the 
result of the prolonged Soviet governance system influence. Current system is a result of 
significant changes in public sector policies undergone in Ukraine due to the intention to 
become a part of the European Union (EU). Ukraine has adopted a number of key legal 




























Code (2010), the Law of Ukraine “On the Main Principles of Public Financial Control in 
Ukraine”, the Concept and the Strategy for Public Finance Management (2012 and 2013 
respectively), the Law of Ukraine “On the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine” (2015) and a large 
number of legal documents concerning internal control and internal audit in the government. 
One of the major steps towards European system of public financial control is the 
development and implementation of the new Budget Code of Ukraine and especially the new 
wording of Article 26, according to which - compulsory introduction should take place for the 
basic components of the European model of PIFC – internal control and internal audit. The 
basic principle of public internal financial control is the separation of internal control and audit 
(Miedviedkova, 2016).  
 
Figure 4.3. Public sector auditing in Ukraine 
Source: constructed by the author. 
According to the clause 1 of paragraph 47 of chapter 13 of the Plan of measures for the 
implementation of Section V (“Economic and industrial cooperation”) of the Association 
Agreement between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the European Union, the European Atomic 
Energy Community and their Member States on the other hand, for 2017-2019, approved by 
the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated September 17, 2014 No. 847, the Due 
to the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine was designated as the main executor responsible for 













Parliament and the EU Council of May 17, 2006 No. 2006/43 / EC on the statutory audit of 
annual accounts and consolidated accounts. Therefore, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 
developed a model for reforming the system of regulation of audit activity in Ukraine in 
accordance with international standards and best international practices. 
In 2015, the Law of Ukraine “On the Accounting Chamber” established the requirement of 
applying the International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAI). Those are 
professional standards and guidelines, essential for the credibility, quality and professionalism 
of public-sector auditing. The implementation of ISSAI in public sector auditing has been 
accomplished by the Ukrainian government through a number of important legal and 
organisational steps over the past years (Tabenska, 2018, p. 819). Ensuring the transparent and 
efficient public finance management, which in turn requires modern control mechanisms is one 
of the key requirements of European community. In particular, changes in the national 
legislation system have reflected a number of conceptual issues raised in ISSAI 1 (the Lima 
Declaration) and ISSAI 2 (the Mexican Declaration) regarding the organisation and 
implementation of external independent financial controls (ISSAI 1; ISSAI 2).  
Consequently, public sector auditing in Ukraine has come a long way for the past 24 years. 
Current public sector auditing system in Ukraine after the number of institutional system and 
regulations changes is illustrated at the Figure 4.3. However, Ukraine is still in a process of 
implementation of reforms aimed on building a more “European-like” system. Therefore, the 
State Audit Service (SAS), which was always a very strong centralized authority, is now in a 
process of reorganisation into the Office of the Financial Control (OFC). OFC is the central 
executive body, whose activity is directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine through the Minister of Finance, that implements state policy in the sphere of state 
financial control. Priority in the work of the OFC will be given to preventive control, which 
will be ensured by analysing and processing data in various IT systems. 
 
4.3.Corruption in Ukraine  
According to numerous analytical reports and surveys, it is corruption that poses the biggest 
problem for both foreign and domestic businesses. Among the apparent problems triggered by 
high levels of bribery and abuse of office are the destruction of the system of social values and 
absolute distrust in public authorities, which ultimately result in negative economic 
consequences, increase inequality and slow down household income growth. 
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Among other reforms, the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 provoked a vast number of anti-
corruption measures in Ukraine. With the help of civil society and international organisations 
(a number of different NGOs, the OECD), a package of laws was adopted. Ukrainian Parliament 
started to develop anti-corruption infrastructure (Figure 4.4). Special institutions were created, 
such as National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), the National Anti-Corruption 
Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) for investigation of corruption, the Special Anti-Corruption 
Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and the National Agency for finding, tracing and management of 
assets derived from corruption and other crimes (ARMA). Recently, the High Anti-Corruption 
Court (HACC) was set up (for more information about anti-corruption bodies in Ukraine, please 
refer to the Appendix 4). New legislation also increased the penalties for corruption, which 
includes administrative or criminal liability for corruption related offences. Another aspect of 
Ukraine’s ongoing anti-corruption reform includes electronic asset disclosure, e-procurement 
and opening up the public registries which aim in increasing transparency in the country 














Figure 4.4. Anti-corruption infrastructure in Ukraine 
Source: constructed by the author (based on Transparency International Ukraine, 2020). 
According to the Model Regulation on the Authorized Unit (Person) for Prevention and 
Detection of Corruption, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree No. 706 dated 
Judicial oversight of observance of the rights, freedom and interests of individuals in criminal proceedings 
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September 4, 2013 “Issues on Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption” bodies, state-owned 
enterprises, which are within the sphere of management of a state body, are determined by an 
authorized person for the prevention and detection of corruption. 
Different types of corruption are distinguished regarding areas of manifestation in the public 
sector. First is political, in particular, corruption in representative bodies of the state. Second is 
corruption in the public service, in particular in the activities of the executive bodies, primarily 
in their activities in providing public services. There is also corruption in the judicial system 
and law enforcement bodies and economy corruption (in public procurement, in the customs 
and tax spheres, etc.). Corruption can appear also in the social sphere (education, healthcare, 
social security, etc.), private sector and sports (CPLR, 2017). 
Figure 4.5. Changes in Ukrainian’s score in CPI 2012-2019 
Source: constructed by the author (based on Transparency International Ukraine, 2020). 
According to the Law of Ukraine “On prevention of corruption”, corruption is defined as 
the use by a specific person of his official powers or related opportunities for the purpose of 
obtaining the “undue advantage” which is defined as “money or other property, preferences, 
advantages, services, non-monetary assets and any other advantage that is being illicitly 
promised, offered, delivered, or received by the person who is authorised to perform public or 
local self-government functions.” Furthermore, it is also prohibited to offer, promise or give an 
undue advantage to a person who offers or promises (agrees) to influence the decision-making 
of a person authorised to perform functions of state, in exchange for such undue advantage (or 
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books and records and/or dissemination of false information are also criminalized in Ukraine, 
together with other financial record-keeping offences. Ukrainian law also prohibits 
“misappropriation, embezzlement or conversion of others’ property due to abuse of office or 
by a person to whom it was entrusted or in whose control it was” (Chambers, 2019). 
And although Ukraine’s ranking in CPI keeps improving every year, current situation is still 
far from being acceptable. According to Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) released in 2019, 
Ukraine ranks 126th for the level of corruption perception in the public sector out of 180 
countries. Figure 4.5 illustrate that anticorruption policies in Ukraine showed negative results 
in the previous year, with the loss of two points, scoring 30 out of 100 (The Corruption 
Perceptions Index, 2019; ACFE, 2018).    
Public trust in Ukrainian central government has decreased in recent years due to the slow 
and ineffective character of changes. Therefore, enabling an environment for the open and full 
participation of civil society in anti-corruption policy development and monitoring must 















V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this chapter empirical findings are presented. Those are perceptions of auditors about the 
role of public sector auditors in Ukrainian central government and how public sector auditors 
could prevent and reduce corruption in Ukraine. To ensure the credibility of the research 
project, the documental analysis was carried out in order to support findings.  
 
5.1.The state of financial control and public sector auditing in Ukraine 
Most informants have claimed satisfactory state of the public sector auditing in Ukraine; 
however, some have an opposite opinion. “The situation is not that we are not institutionally 
prepared, but that we do not know how to act. Institutionally we meet both world and European 
requirements” (External auditor 1). The adoption of international standards promoted reforms 
and gave a second life to the public sector auditing in Ukraine, however, it is still in process of 
change. Over the last decade, Ukraine cooperates with international institutions that help to 
reform the government sector (e.g. Twinning, SIGMA, GIZ projects). Within those programs, 
comments and recommendations regarding public management, budget policy, financial 
management and control, internal and external audit, public procurement and administrative 
services were prepared. Currently, bilateral cooperation project between the Ministry of 
Finance of Ukraine and the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands is underdone in order to 
draft the Public Sector Internal Auditors Development Program.  
Attention should be drawn to the steps that are currently being implemented by the 
Ukrainian government and the Head of the ACU. In 2019, they announced the Development 
Strategy of the Accounting Chamber for 2019–2024 (ACU Strategy), based on the practical 
experience of the leading SAIs of the INTOSAI member states and in compliance with the 
requirements of national law.  
With the implementation of the new Law of Ukraine “On the Accounting Chamber” in 
2015, “public sector auditing in Ukraine became less “one-sided” (ACU auditor 1). The Law 
of Ukraine “On the Accounting Chamber” introduced procedures on the approval of the reports 
by the auditee and granted them power to provide their comments. Therefore, auditees are now 
also invited to the discussion and have more rights in public sector auditing. According to the 
ACU Strategy (2019: p.3), by 2024 ACU aims to become “an independent, professional, 
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objective and impartial, open to-a-dialogue auditor and advisor, a model of perfect 
management and an exemplary organisation to the auditee”.  
With the development of that, IAF also became a subject to change for the past years. 
Pursuant to the changes made to the National Standards of the Internal audit in 2012 with the 
Resolution of the Ministry of Finances No. 1247, the concept of internal audit and internal 
control were separated. External auditor 1 said, “manager develops system of internal control 
(based on the COSO framework), therefore, IA are entitled to give their recommendations about 
its effective operation”. Internal auditor 1 said, “IA are not allowed to engage in and formulate 
internal control policies; this function is directly assigned to the manager […] they monitor the 
activities, which in turn prevents the use of certain illegal expenditures”. However, as argued 
by External auditor 1, “our internal audit departments do not perform the functions that they 
must perform”. Moreover, various audits conducted by the ACU confirm unsatisfactory state 
of the IAF “the results of our assessments show that IAF in Ukraine need significant 
improvements” (ACU auditor 3).  
Furthermore, certain issues were mentioned by informants with regard to the public sector 
auditing, the most striking among them are: 
1. Implementation of basic ISSAI. “As soon as you decide to implement international 
standards, you need to start from the first basic Roman level - publicity, transparency and 
independence” (External auditor 1). For instance, there are no press conferences of the ACU at 
which citizens can ask questions and get clarifications. Reports are harder to reach than at the 
webpages of other European SAI’s, furthermore, they are difficult to understand due to the 
highly complicated professional language. “It is important to set the task of implementing ISSAI 
Level 2 and that their work is understandable for ordinary citizens to ensure the quality of life 
of citizens” (External auditor 1).  
2. Duplication of functions. It should be noted that two institutions (ACU and SAS) are 
copying the functions of each other. “Our plan is agreed by the Cabinet of Ministers, how is it 
agreed with the ACU, we do not know […] but they are overlapping, especially in central 
government” (SAS auditor). “We often come to the object after audit on similar matter was 
already performed by the SAS […] this state of affairs should be regulated better […] this is 
not normal when two different institutions are performing the same functions” (ACU auditor 
3). 
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3. The lack of legal framework. Legal framework should be constantly adjusted to the new 
requirements; therefore, the competencies of authorized persons to carry out audit need to be 
updated. It needs an effective legal framework to identify all elements of the system, coordinate 
activities, coordinate the internal work of the audit units and protect the interests of users of 
information. “If we had a strong legal framework, it would eliminate all the issues in the area” 
(ACU auditor 4).“There is lack of the law on Internal Financial Control and the corresponding 
penalties of heads of bodies for inadequate internal control system” (Internal auditor 3).  
Moreover, functions of some audit institutions are overlapped, as stated by Internal 
auditor 5, “It is necessary to analyse the current regulatory framework on these issues in order 
to eliminate contradictions and duplication of functions in the process of public sector 
auditing”.  Moreover, public sector auditing in Ukraine requires state financing and increasing 
of staffing to ensure an effective audit. Improved regulatory could contribute to those matters 
as well. 
3. The lack of staff qualifications and methodological provision to effectively find 
weaknesses in the activity of the institution and provide quality recommendations to ensure the 
optimal operation of such an institution. “ACU and SAS auditors have a very low motivation 
and there are not good workers anymore” (Internal auditor 1). Methodology should be publicly 
available and simple, for all the actors, involved on the process of public sector auditing to 




















5.2.Main actors of financial control and public sector auditing in Ukraine 
Main actors of public sector auditing are presented at the Figure 5.1 below. Actors with 
general competencies and power in Ukraine were mentioned within the Research Context 











Figure 5.1. Main actors of public sector audit in Ukraine 
Source: materials provided by External auditor 1. 
State audit in Ukraine comprises from the external and internal, representing the 
parliamentary and governmental financial control. The external (parliamentary) audit is 
represented by the ACU – the SAI in Ukraine. Internal audit (governmental) consists of 
centralized and decentralized. Centralised are departments of the Ministry of Finance, which 
coordinate all internal services and carries out the main load of the current and preliminary 
control. Currently this body (SAS) is under the reorganisation process (into the OFC). 
Decentralized internal audit is presented by the IAF in central government bodies, organised in 
Ukraine following the separation of internal control and internal audit departments (De Koning, 
1999). 
Other external auditors, in contrast with foreign experience, exists in Ukraine separately 
from the state audit. There is a discussion on the theoretical level about the possible involvement 













Supreme Audit Institution in Ukraine 
ACU is a constitutional body of the government’s external financial control mechanism 
and an independent authority acting on behalf of Parliament of Ukraine. It acts in accordance 
with the Law “On the Accounting Chamber”, the Budgetary Code of Ukraine and other by-
laws. ACU executes control and supervision over revenues and expenditures of the state budget 
and is not entrusted with judicial powers. Activities of ACU are audits, provision of expert 
analyses, monitoring and evaluation. The ACU has been performing financial, performance and 
compliance audits of the entities, institutions, organisations and Ministries which utilize State 
Budget funds (Miedviedkova, 2016). 
According to the Law of Ukraine "On the Accounting Chamber", the ACU conducts two 
main audits: performance and financial. “Performance auditing - 80% of activities of all 
departments, financial – less as it is not so requested, because politician wants to hear so called 
'fried facts' […] we are ahead other countries in performance auditing, because we started 
from developing this one, when other were developing financial. Not all ACU departments make 
financial, but all are professional in performance” (ACU auditor 1). Performance auditing in 
Ukraine appeared in 2001 with Swedish support and teaching. However, it was assigned to the 
ACU from the very beginning when it was created (in 1996), but it “gathered momentum in 
time, became more visible and professional” (ACU auditor 1). “Main aim of the performance 
audit is to see the drawbacks in policies and propose impowered actors (parliament) to change 
it, only external audit can say those main actors which changes should be introduced” (ACU 
auditor 1). 
ACU annual report (2018) evidences that the main result of all the public sector audits 
undertaken in 2018 was the provision of clear, well-reasoned and well-considered 
recommendations. The main purpose of recommendations made by the ACU is to improve the 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy of the use of the state budget of Ukraine. Furthermore, 
public sector auditing aims in preventing all kinds of violations and drawbacks in the public 
financial management system. “Public sector auditing aims not only to see the violation, but 
also to find out imperfections in the auditee management, organisation and to improve 
regulations. Therefore, audit does not cover operations of some budget program, its scope is 
wider. ACU auditors take few regions and make an analysis about their general functioning” 
(ACU auditor 1). 
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Therefore, due to the years of practice of performance auditing by the ACU in Ukraine, the 
role of external auditors is expected to undergone major changes to not be further perceived as 
“watchdogs”. As stated by ACU auditor 1 “Obligatory requirement for the ACU functioning is 
for auditors not to be just “watchdogs”, but rather to find weak places of the auditee and 
together to draw up the “road map”. ACU auditor 1 also mentioned that if the auditee agrees, 
the ACU further start to promote changes by changing internal policies or drafting proposals to 
the Parliament.  
However, some claim that auditors’ role remained traditional “auditor still perform Soviet 
Union role which is based on the principle of finding violations and further punishment, 
consultation is very rare […] in reports – only thousands of violations” (External auditor 3).  
The scope of performance auditing in Ukraine seems to be limited to the identification of 
the “efficiency” of budgetary institutions. According to the Law of Ukraine “On the Accounting 
Chamber”, performance audit provides assessment on: the timeliness and completeness of 
budget revenues; productivity, efficiency, and economic use of budget funds by their managers 
and recipients; legality, timeliness, and completeness of making management decisions by 
participants of the budget process; and the state of internal control on budget managers funds 
(Gurzhii et al. (2019). Thus, the quality of such audit can be also questioned, due to the limited 
nature, comparing with the performance auditing globally.  
Furthermore, it can be argued that most auditors are not aware about their role in the process 
of the public audit “roles should be formed on the top level and transferred to auditors better. 
Now auditors are doing all audits at ones, performance has elements of financial and 
compliance and vice versa, categories are used in a wrong way and very mixed” (ACU auditor 
2). Performance audit in fact has been performed for 20 years in Ukraine, but there is no special 
methodology or matrix. ACU is using internal recommendations how to make performance 
auditing, which raises two main issues. First is that auditees are unaware about the categories 
used by auditors to assess the effectiveness of the institutions, those internal documents do not 
have a free access and are operating with highly professional categories. Therefore, 
“representatives of the public sector should know the rules of the game, but they do not know” 
(External auditor 1). 
Secondly, experienced auditors have their own methodology, however, others can miss 
some indicators. “I am using 3E in performance audits, but not all auditors know about this” 
(ACU auditor 2). “I use more than 12 different comparisons, performance auditing is very wide, 
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because it is more subjective than other forms of audit. I will tell my own methodology, it 
includes 3 main points: 1) action-inactivity (who, when, under which power made some 
negative activities or financial operations); 2) result (which exactly laws were violated). Many 
stop here, but it is very important to go further and also look at the 3) consequences (for 
example some resources were not used, or more, not effectively, not efficiently, not economy; 
we should show how those consequences influence the aim of the budget program” (ACU 
auditor 1). The work on new methodology started in 2015 when the new Law of Ukraine "On 
the Accounting Chamber" came into force, however, the document is still not published.  
 
Internal audit actors 
According to the Methodological guidelines for internal audit in the Ukrainian public sector 
(IA Guidelines), internal auditors interact with the head of the institution (manager), audit 
committee and the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 2019).  
According to the Order No. 1001 and the National Internal Audit Standards, managers are 
responsible for the approval of provisions on the internal audit unit, the amount of time required 
to conduct all internal audits, IA workload, strategic and operational plans for the IAF, internal 
audit programs, the regulatory document for conducting internal audits and internal audit 
assurance and quality improvement programs. Manager signs an internal audit declaration 
indicating the purpose (mission) and goals, principles of independence are the core powers and 
responsibilities of the internal audit. There is a general problem due to the manager’s reluctance 
towards the change in roles of the public sector auditors which is presented in the next 
subsection.  
Audit committees are formed in government agencies as a platform for discussing 
management, control and audit issues (Ministry of Finances, 2019). 
Ministry of Finances of Ukraine is the central executive body, the activities of which are 
directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The perception of auditors is 
that there are no control functions anymore as all the institutions are controlled by the Ministry 
of Finance of Ukraine “how SAS manager can say anything about his own manager, there are 





“Ukrainian parliament have the greatest influence on the public sector auditing, they form 
the politics and rules of the game” (ACU auditor 4). 
Another perception is that main actors are public authorities and local governments (“their 
role are to ensure the legality of financial discipline, the appropriateness and effectiveness of 




Due to the Association Agreement between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the European 
Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, Ukraine cooperates 
with the EU on the implementation of the international standards and improvement of the public 
sector. In 2006 an assessment of Ukrainian public administration as a part of the SIGMA project 
(Support for Improvement in Governance and Management ) was conducted with the financial 
support of DFID (Ministry of International Development of the United Kingdom) and SIDA 
(Swedish International Development Agency) and with the consent of the European 
Commission. The recommendation on the internal and external audit improvement were 
included in the Strategy of Public Administration Reform for 2016-2020 (Centre for Adaptation 
of the Civil Service, 2019).  
Starting from 2008, Ukraine cooperates with the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands, 
which was prolonged in 2019 for the 3 years period. The Memorandum on cooperation signed 
in 2019 between the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands and the Ministry of Finance of 
Ukraine opened an opportunity for the exchange of knowledge in the public sector audit 
(Ministry of Finance, 2019, October 18).  
As a member of INTOSAI and EUROSAI, Ukraine gains positive experience in building 
an effective system of public sector auditing, although, must comply with international 





5.3.Performance auditing and new roles of public sector auditors in Ukrainian central 
government 
According to the Budget Code of Ukraine, the IAF aims in improvement of the governance 
and internal control, and therefore should result in the creation of the so-called “added value”. 
However, as of today, the nature of IAF is not yet systematic and diagnostic and does not focus 
on assessing the effectiveness of the management and internal control system. In particular, in 
2018, the part of performance audits in IAF was approximately 12% (Ministry of Finance, 
2019).  
According to the new Methodological guidelines for internal audit in the Ukrainian public 
sector (IA Guidelines), the perception about the IAF should not be limited to the inspection 
activity aimed in identifying facts of violations and providing written requirements to eliminate 
such. IA are presented as “helpers” and “supporters” of managers and institution due to their 
independent and objective assessment (Ministry of Finance, 2019). IA Guidelines set 









Figure 5.2. Areas in focus and IA roles according to the IA Guidelines  
Source: constructed by the author (based on Ministry of Finance (2019)). 
Therefore, according to IA Guidelines, IA provide recommendations on: 1) Improvement 
of the governance system, internal control, including risk management processes; 2) 
Improvement of policies and procedures to prevent the facts of illegal, inefficient, and 
ineffective use of budget funds, the occurrence of errors or other shortcomings in the activities 
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of the institution; 3) Strengthening accountability and improving the effectiveness of the 
institution, etc. (Ministry of Finance, 2019). 
However, the obtained information shows that new IA Guidelines are far from being 
implemented in the Ukrainian central government. The lack of experience, control power and 
managers support results in the slow change of the IA role behavior. Therefore, most of 
informants perceive their roles “de facto” as revisors or inspectors, who should search for 
violations and eliminate them. “They were separated, but IAF is really the same as control” 
(Internal auditor 2). “The role is closer to control; advisory is very rare” (Internal auditor 1). 
One informant stated that the role of public sector auditors is rather important, however, he 
connected it with the ability to ensure the financial discipline at the institution, which can be 
used to explain the “watchdog” role, not advisory. Those findings contribute to the IAF review, 
conducted by the Ministry of Finances in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance of the 
Netherlands (IAF review) which show that the IAF function didn’t get rid of inspection roots, 
both in its perception (in particular, by management) and in approaches to work. Therefore, IA 
work is more based on responding to incidents and search for violations (Ministry of Finances, 
2018, June 26).  
There is also documental support to the information provided by the respondents in 
Methodological Guidelines for Internal Performance Audit (IPA Guidelines) published by the 
Ministry of Finances of Ukraine in recent edition of 2019 year. “Public sector IAF (introduced 
in 2012) is still often perceived by management as an inspection/control function aimed at 
detecting irregularities related to financial processes” (Ministry of Finance, 2019: p. 3). Such 
role behavior results from pressures placed on the IA by their managers. IA are unable to fulfil 
their advisory function (although they want to), because management requires other actions, 
namely the identification of violations, and this should provide an internal control system. 
“Even if auditors want to give recommendations, managers expect them to limit their functions 
to identification of errors and violations. […] Our managers do not consider IA as consultants; 
they simply do not even understand how someone can give them advice and “manage” them. 
Therefore, they continue to consider and force to perform the role of “watchdogs” (External 
auditor 1). Ministry of Finances (2018, June 26) identified that principles of organisational and 
functional independence of internal audit units, defined by national legislation, are not always 
present in practice. IAF review also addressed the problem in the proper positioning and 
performance of the role assigned to the IA, nonetheless, it presented some progress in the 
managers’ understanding the IAF role. The results showed that 8 out of 15 managers understand 
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the role of the IAF and only 24% of IA claimed about manager’s unawareness (Ministry of 
Finances, 2018, June 26). However, interviews undertook for this research presented that more 
than 60% of respondents perceive that their managers do not understand new roles of auditors. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that such pressures are formed due to the organisational 
factors. Weak internal control mechanism or even its absence is the reason for managers to put 
the same expectations both on IA and internal control units. “No one performs function of 
control […] as result it is placed on us” (Internal auditor 1). “[…] the weak link is the internal 
control system” (External auditor 1). Due to the results of the internal control assessment 
(review), conducted with the expert help from the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands, 
central planning (which is predominant in government) impede the development of financial 
management and control into a more modern internal control environment. The assessment also 
presents the lack of managers’ awareness of the internal control importance (Ministry of 
Finance, 2019, April 1). Therefore, Internal auditor 3 proposed the adoption of law on Internal 
Financial Control and the corresponding penalties of heads of bodies for inadequate internal 
control system. 
Moreover, informants raised more issues regarding the IAF functioning. First relates to the 
implementation of their recommendations “Our recommendations are often not implemented 
[…] in some cases, organisations benefit from being non-profit to get extra money from 
government” (Internal auditor 7).  
The next one is connected to number of employees and their personal qualifications “There 
is a lack of qualified specialists who can effectively find weaknesses in the activity of the 
institution and provide high quality recommendations to ensure the optimal operation of such 
an institution” (Internal auditor 6). “The main problem is the large number of controlled objects 
in relation to the insufficient staffing of the auditors” (Internal auditor 2). This affirms the 
results obtained by the Ministry of Finances in 2018. According to the IA review, IAF is not 
carried in fact due to complete understaffing (40% of IA units had 1-2 internal auditors). For 
example, one IA at the Ministry of Education and Science in Ukraine had 242 objects to audit 
in 2018. IA review also presents high staff turnover rate (up to 50% in small units), lack of the 
appropriate skills, competencies and knowledge, insufficient training market and resources for 
IA activities (including material, software, business travel, etc.) (less than a third of IA units 
are satisfied with the resources) (Ministry of Finances, 2018, June 26). “Employers are raising 
43 
the question of auditors professionalism […] we change master programs to prepare future 
auditors better” (ACU auditor 4). 
Nevertheless, IA are trying to cope with the discussed issues and follow the international 
standards and IA Guidelines in their work. As stated by Internal auditor 3“mandatory element 
of any audit, regardless of whether internal or external, is to give recommendations and 
communicate them to the higher level to the managers or politicians”. Therefore, limited 
number of IA in Ukrainian central government succeeds in providing recommendations as 
assigned to them in the IA Guidelines. In contrast with majority of interviews, one respondent 
stated that auditors in their department are advisory and can perform such role. “Our auditors 
are not “watchdogs”, we don’t punish, we advise about the institution systems effective 
functioning” (Internal auditor 3). The reason for this is “the ability of manager to communicate 
our new role to the head of the institution” (Internal auditor 3). One more case is found from 
the publicly available interview, published at the website of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine 
(Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2018). “The priority of auditors is not punishment for 
deficiencies found, but the provision of recommendations that will help them work better and 
avoid mistakes”, therefore, this interview shows helpers role of auditors and shift in roles within 
the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. The success of reforms at the institution is explained with 
the Certified Internal Auditors training undergone by IA as well as thematic trainings on IT 
Audit, Risk Management Audit, Modern Audit Methodology, and Performance Audit. These 
activities were carried out under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom. IA at the Ministry of Defence 
of Ukraine perceive themselves as “helpers of leaders in implementation of “good 
governance”, improvement of resource management and integrity development” (Ministry of 
Defence of Ukraine, 2018). However, no IAF assessments and interviews were conducted in 
this institution (although interviews were requested by the author). Therefore, there are no 
evidences for the information, provided at the website and should not be perceived as one truth. 
However, as informants stated, advisory role of IA is enhanced year by year, since for the 
effective operation of the institution auditors should understand and systematically see the 
shortcomings. It can be also argued with the example of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine 
that stuff professional growth and international help possibly led to the real change in roles 
within the institution.  
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5.4.Public sector auditing in preventing and reducing corruption  
All respondents agree that public sector audit is an effective tool in the fight against 
corruption in Ukraine. “I would even say it is one of the key ones” (ACU auditor 2). “It is not 
the only one tool, but it performs it role well. It helps other actors to perform anti-corruption 
procedures further” (ACU auditor 1). According to Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) Report to the Nations, the research conducted since 2010 shows that 15% of corruption 
cases were detected by internal audit, and 4% by external (ACFE, 2018).  
However, neither international nor national internal audit standards place full responsibility 
for exposing fraud to internal auditors. According to 1210.A2 IIA standard “Internal auditors 
must have sufficient knowledge to evaluate the risk of fraud and the manner in which it is 
managed by the organisation, but are not expected to have the expertise of a person whose 
primary responsibility is detecting and investigating fraud”. 
According to the ACFE (2018), this knowledge is required for IA to identify "red flags" 
that may indicate fraud, understand the fraud characteristics and techniques used for the 
implementation of fraud, various fraudulent schemes and scenarios, evaluate the signs of fraud 
and decide whether further action is needed and whether an investigation is recommended and 
evaluate the effectiveness of controls to prevent or detect fraud. ACU auditor 1 said “There are 
people “on the other side” who are working in the specific area for years (accountants, 
managers etc.). Auditors are not necessary accountants; good auditors are those who have 
different skills […] to reveal corruption better”.  
Informants are not performing work specifically to detect corruption. When conducting 
audit activities, internal auditors should focus on evaluating the internal control system and on 
the management of such risks, but not directly on the fraud investigations. In order to prevent 
fraud, the management of the institution must eliminate the factors that encourage employees 
to commit illegal activities, with special attention to strengthening and improving the 
effectiveness of the internal control system, to curb the possibility of fraud (Ministry of Finance, 
2019). 
Decision of the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption dated December 2, 2016 
No. 126 approved the Methodology for assessing corruption risks in the activities of the 
authorities, which defines a set of rules and procedures for the evaluation of corruption risks in 
the activities of the authorities in which anti-corruption programs are adopted in accordance 
with part one of Article 19 of the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption”. According 
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to this methodology, the risk assessment should be carried out by a working group set up by the 
authority and reflected in the Corruption Risk Assessment Report. 
“Performance auditing is the most effective audit to identify corruption risks in an 
institution. Also, continuous monitoring of financial activities, targeted use of public funds and 
verification of the performance of functions provided by the relevant state body” (Internal 
auditor 2). However, auditors of budgetary institutions have been separated from the tasks of 
preventing corruption. As shown at the previous chapter, there are special authorised internal 
unit in each central government institution and a highly complicated system of anti-corruption 
bodies. While on the one hand those units were created to combat corruption, on the other, 
informants raised the issue about the effectiveness of their existence. “A position to combat 
corruption was created. [..] The reason is that everyone wants to show the “fight” against 
corruption. How to show it? Such a special position as a fighter against corruption is a perfect 
option” (External auditor 1).  
Therefore, the effectiveness of their work is questioned, as well as the effectiveness of 
auditors work within the current scope. “This special authorised corruption unit is not effective. 
But internal audit the way it is now is not an effective tool as well, they need to have more 
control power” (Internal auditor 1). Therefore, I can conclude on the other issue raised by 
informants which is the lack of auditor’s power and independency “If managers supported 
internal auditors, they would really prevent and reduce corruption. […] no motivation to 
prevent corruption because this auditor can be fired” (Internal auditor 1). 
As reasonably stated by External auditor 1, “At a budgetary institution, nothing happens 
without senior management approval, thus, all decisions can be seen in the documents”. 
Therefore, auditors can see “indicators” of corruption in the official documents. According to 
the IA Guidelines, the most well-known indicators (“red flags”) of possible fraud are classified 
by types of fraud, for corruption they are presented in the Table 5.1. 
It is obligatory for auditors to present in the audit report the information about possible 
fraud facts and notification to the head of the institution about such facts. Moreover, all 
respondents are acknowledging the existence within their entity of an “Anti-Corruption Policy” 
(i.e. a framework for prevention and sanction of Corruption). Such a framework could be used 
for compliance audit and may form the basis for IA assessment of the effectiveness of the 
policy. 
Public sector auditors - whether appointed by the legislature or the executive or elected by 
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the voters - must be prepared to recognise and report corruption, abuse of authority, or failure 
to provide equity or due process in the exercise of a governmental police or regulatory activity. 
Because such reporting may challenge powerful or entrenched interests, auditors require some 
measure of job protection to be able to report independently (IIA, 2012).  
Table 5.1. The most common “red flags” of corruption in the public sector 
Identified by the Ministry of Finances 
1.  The standard of living of a worker exceeds significantly the level corresponding to the 
size of the legally received wage 
2. Full control of one person/closed small group 
3. Staff not informed/staff not valued 
4. Staff never go on vacation, often work overtime or take home work unnecessarily 
5. People who do not want to share a cabinet/use a private mailbox, instead of the office, 
very careful (always close the cabinet, cabinets) 
6. Visitors without obvious reasons, long phone conversations by private phone behind 
closed doors/outside 
7. Unreasonable, excessive concentration of influence on one person 
8. Numerous contracts below the limits that exceed the tender requirement 
9. Dissatisfied staff, very negative about the institution and the manager 
10. Staff complaints are not given serious consideration or are not allowed or punishable  
Interviews 
11. “We see corruption when actions are made in someone’s interest, when we compare 
real state of affairs with what is presented in documents […] when everything goes to 
one company, when tenders are won by one person” (ACU auditor 1). 
12. “When the decision is unreasonable, it is not accepted in favour of the minimum price, 
strange applications are confirmed without a qualitative criterion” (External auditor 
1). 
13. “Conflict of interests, raising the amount of salary, bonuses without managers 
agreement” (Internal auditor 1). 
Source: constructed by the author (based on the information from interviews and the 
Ministry of Finances, 2019). 
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Informants also claimed about independence of the IAF within their organisations, as well 
as coordination of their activities with national external bodies. Both are believed to help 
auditors to prevent and reduce corruption better. As stated by External auditor 3 “There are 





















6.1. Role senders and expectations  
The study identified five main role senders in Ukrainian central government, which are: 
international organisations, ACU, Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, politicians, and senior 
managers at institutions. The involvement of international organisations became more visible 
in 2014, when Ukraine signed the Association Agreement with the EU. Those organisations put 
pressure at the highest level, primarily influencing the development of the legal framework in 
Ukraine in accordance with the international standards. Furthermore, international 
organisations actively participate in the implementation of their expectations, by enchasing 
factors, which have an impact on the role behavior.  
Legal and regulatory environment reflects the general expectations of a role set in a given 
context, therefore, shaping the role behavior (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Roussy, 2013). Politicians 
in Ukraine (i.e. the legislative branch represented by the Verkhovna Rada) are entitled to pass 
their expectations in the form of laws. It can be stated that institutionally and regulatory, 
Ukraine meets international standards. Therefore, as research shows, the expectations of 
Ukrainian politicians reflect the expectations of international organisations.  
With the influence of first two role senders, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine has a more 
direct role in framing the role set. It is responsible for the development of a model for reforming 
the system of audit activity in Ukraine in accordance with international standards and best 
international practices.  
Various incentives and organisational instruments, including auditing, are used in public 
sector to lead the actors in the desired direction (Strøm, 2000). By conducting performance 
audits, ACU expects IAF to further implement their recommendations on the improvement of 
the government institutions effectiveness.  
Senior managers (i.e. head of institution) set expectations in internal documents of the 
organisation (e.g. IA provisions, programs, strategic and operational plans, etc.). Moreover, 
managers sign an internal audit declaration indicating the purpose (mission) and goals, as well 
as independence and responsibilities of the IA department.   
The role of auditors in Ukrainian central government is drawn by Ukrainian politicians 
according to the international standards, further modelled and implemented by the Ministry of 
Finances. According to the Budget Code of Ukraine, the IAF aims in improvement of the 
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governance and internal control, and therefore should result in the creation of the so-called 
“added value”. General expectation on the role of auditors goes as follows: 1) Advisory role (to 
provide recommendations on the improvement of the governance system, internal control, 
including risk management processes; 2) Protection role (prevent the facts of illegal, inefficient 
and ineffective use of budget funds, the occurrence of errors or other shortcomings in the 
activities of the institution); 3) Guidance role (to provide recommendations on the improvement 
of policies and procedures at the institution) (Ministry of Finance, 2019).  
However, the results show that there is a general problem with understanding the role of the 
IA and its identification with inspection activities. The expectations of senior management 
significantly influence the work of the IAF. While expectations formed by international 
organisations, ACU, politicians and Ministry of Finances converge, management expectations 
(and perceptions of the role of internal audit) differ significantly from institution to institution. 
In most cases, management accepts and uses the internal audit function as an internal control 
function. 
Organisational characteristics (culture, size, structure, etc.) are believed to have a direct 
influence on the role senders’ expectations (Lynch, 2007; Wickham & Parker, 2007). This 
analysis reveals that managers place expectations on auditors to perform control role due to the 
weak internal control units at the Ukrainian central government. Therefore, auditors are unable 
to advice on the internal control effective operation as there is a general absence of such 
function within the institution. Managers put pressure on the IAF, which causes IA to 
experience the role stress in the form of the role conflict. In other words, from the Three Lines 
of Defence model perspective, the second line in governmental institutions is replaced by the 
third line.  
Ministry of Finances is cooperating with various international organisations in eliminating 
the role ambiguity, which had previously existed among public sector auditors (Kahn et al., 
1964). Documents issued in recent years (e.g. IA, IPA Guidelines) consist of well-defined and 
clarified expectations, as well as detailed guide for the correct role behavior. However, even 
though it was out of scope of the research, I identified that role ambiguity is still present in 
activities of the SAI in Ukraine. Paradoxically, for 20 years of performance auditing no guiding 
document was created. Therefore, it was found that most auditors of the ACU do not understand 
the scope and parameters of their job, the goals they should be pursuing and their priorities. 
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This creates uncertainty about the quality of the performance auditing carried out by the ACU, 
although, more research is required for the better understanding of those findings.  
This research also identified that no expectations from role senders are placed on the public 
sector auditors to prevent and reduce corruption directly. It can be explained by the existence 
of the complex anti-corruption infrastructure, as well as a special position inside the 
governmental bodies. Auditors should not participate in corruption investigation but highlight 
the areas of diseconomy. However, it is obligatory for auditors to present in the audit report the 
information about possible facts of corruption and notification to the head of the institution 
about such facts. Moreover, as research shows, the “Anti-Corruption Policy” (i.e. a framework 
for prevention and sanction of Corruption) exists in each governmental institution, therefore, 
auditors are expected to assess the effectiveness of such policy and improve it further. 
Special attention should be drawn to the creation of “zero-tolerance” environment for 
corruption. IAF should be focused on strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the 
internal control system, to curb the possibility of fraud. As stated by Katzenbach, Oelschlegel 
& Thomas (2016: p.1) “Culture is the self-sustaining pattern of behavior that determines how 
things are done”. It is expected that auditors have enough knowledge, skills and other 
competencies to effectively evaluate the risk of corruption emergence, and the way it is 
managed by the organisation. When conducting audit activities, internal auditors are expected 
to focus on evaluating the internal control system and on the management of such risks. By 
eliminating the possibility of corrupt activities within the organisation with the use of the 
performance auditing in the right way, it is expected that management will be able to combat 
corruption and prevent its future emergence.  
 
6.2. Role stress 
According to Dale & Fox (2008), role conflicts occur when there is incomparability or 
disagreement between an auditor’s and organisation’s tasks, resources, rules or policies. Role 
conflict also occurs when several role senders have different role expectations (Byrne & Pierce, 
2007; Marginson & Bui, 2009). Two role conflicts were identified in the study: the inter-sender 
and intra-sender (Kahn et al., 1964). 
The first one applies when pressure from different role senders are in conflict (Kahn et al., 
1964). The division between the internal audit and internal control took place in 2012, with the 
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adoption of the new regulatory framework. However, it is found that managers are still mixing 
those concepts and placing “wrong” expectations on the IAF.  
Under the pressure of the European community, Ukrainian politicians have issued new 
regulatory framework setting new roles for auditors. At the same time, managers perception is 
that auditors lack competence, therefore, auditors in general are not recognised as those who 
can give recommendations. 
Consequently, internal auditors appear in “Dilemma” between the two role senders with 
contradicting expectations. Auditors are pushed in different ways as illustrated in the “Status 
Triangle Dilemma” in the first chapter (Figure 2.2). International actors expect auditors to 
perform the role of helpers and consultants of their institutions and to help with the development 
of the effective internal control. While managers are perceiving auditors more as “watchdogs”, 
therefore, having a pressure on auditors in the form of salary and promotion (Figure 6.1).  
 
 




Figure 6.1. The illustration of the inter-sender role conflict in                         
Ukrainian central government 
Source: constructed by the author.  
Intra-sender conflict appears when incompatible prescriptions and proscriptions are placed 
from the single role sender (Kahn et al., 1964). The research shows that international 
organisations, Ukrainian politicians, ACU and Ministry of Finances expect auditors to improve 
the governance and internal control. However, empirical findings also present that no 
environment was created for this specific role behavior. The lack of employees makes it 
impossible for auditors to perform their role properly. Moreover, the professionalism of those 
employed should be significantly improved.  









by strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the governance, risk management and 
internal control system. However, due to the existing organisational environment and absence 
of the internal control, auditors are unable to improve the system, being forced to perform 
control and inspection functions instead.  
According to the study of Senatra (1980: p. 601): “one of the ways to reduce role stress is 
to eliminate the stress-producing element”. The degree of stress experienced by the auditor 
may be reduced if managers could be made more aware about which characteristics of the 
organisational climate are related to the conflict. Therefore, the creation of the strong internal 
control system would place the control role on the right actors at the institution, giving IA an 
ability to perform assistance and consultancy at the 3 areas: governance, internal control and 
risk management. Assuring auditors independence, attracting more qualified employees and 
developing the educational and training programs would assure the proper performance of the 
auditors’ roles. Consequently, auditors will be able to prevent and reduce corruption by 
improving systems at organisation.  
According to Kahn et al. (1964), there are two responses to the role stress: behavioral coping 
efforts and effective symptom formation. There is an evidence that public sector auditors in 
Ukrainian central government try to correspond to expectations, although, they correspond to 
the expectations of the manager. With the pressure from higher level, the majority of auditors 
are performing roles, assigned to them by their managers. An attempt to modify demands was 
successfully underwent by one of the respondents, who claimed about the importance of the 
role communication by IA manager to the higher level. However, general perception of 
informants is that auditors are lacking power and independence, therefore, there are obstacles 
with modifying their role behavior from the bottom level.  
 
6.3. Role behavior  
Study shows that the role performed by public sector auditors in Ukrainian central 
government varies from institution to institution. This depends on the difference in expectations 
and various factors as presented at the Figure 6.2 below. 
As a result of the role stress, organisational environment (structure), skills and 
competencies, number of staff and level of independence of auditors in Ukrainian central 
government - the “watchdog” (control, inspection) role is prevailing in IAF in Ukraine. The 
53 
control role is placed on the auditors in Ukrainian central government by managers of 
organisation and enacted under the impact of the factors presented at the Figure 6.2. The focus 
is mainly on the assessment of legality and reliability of reporting, accuracy of accounting and 
compliance with legislative acts, rather than on a systematic approach to improve the internal 
control system. According to the Ministry of Finance, performance auditing occupies 12% of 
the IA activities. This shows that public sector auditors do not perform the role, assigned to 



















Figure 6.2. Process and factors of the public sector auditor’s role enactment 
Source: constructed by the author. 
Limited number of institutions are performing the role as helpers or advisors. All public 
sector auditors are aware about the new advisory-like role that they are expected to perform. 
However, the low percentage of performance audits in their activities indicate that auditors are 
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The study identified that weak internal control mechanism or even its absence is the reason 
for managers to put the same expectations both on IA and internal control units. Due to such 
factors as existing organisational environment, auditors are unable to improve the system, being 
forced to perform control and inspection functions instead. 
The majority of informants stated about the lack of managers support, as they are still 
perceived and expected to perform the role of “watchdogs”. Moreover, the research showed 
that the lack of auditors independence is present: wishing to fulfil their advisory function they 
are unable to do so, because management requires other actions, namely the identification of 
violations. As argued by Ahmad and Taylor (2009), the more internal role conflicts auditors 
experience - the less importance they grant to independence. As evidenced by the Ministry of 
Finances (2019), independence of public sector in practice differs from its provision at the 
national legislation. Therefore, the independence of public sector auditors may be questioned, 
however, specific study is required on the issue within the same context in order to get a clear 
picture about the level of independence of public sector auditors in Ukrainian central 
government. Nonetheless, due to the important nature which the principle of independence 
poses in the public sector audit (Flint, 1988; Hollingsworth, White, & Harden, 1998; Mautz & 
Sharaf, 1961; Normanton, 1966; Power, 2005), this factor may have a significant impact on the 
role behavior.  
There is also an enormous workload due to the critical understaffing, few auditors are 
unable to perform an in-depth assessment of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the 
huge governmental institution. Skills and professionalism are the next factors, which are 
missing for the enactment of the advisory role. According to findings, “obstructive” aspect, 
presented by Morin & Hazgui (2016), may be also present in Ukrainian central government. 
The changes in auditors’ roles, which few respondents claimed about, could probably be a result 
of their own self-efficacy expectations. 
All activities at the Ukrainian central government are present in the official documents, 
approved by the senior management. By playing the role of “watchdogs”, auditors in Ukraine 
can identify "red flags" that may indicate corruption. Public sector auditors are able to 
understand the characteristics and techniques used for the implementation of corruption, 
various fraudulent schemes and scenarios, evaluate the signs of corruption and decide whether 
further action is needed and whether an investigation is recommended. Consequently, 
presenting those finding in the reports for the further actions of special anti-corruption units and 
managers. Various indicators can point out the corruption activities, some of them are presented 
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at the empirical chapter of the study, although, those indicators may significantly vary from 
institution to institution.  
However, while there is a general expectation that auditors can create system and culture in 
which the appearance of corruption would become impossible, current situation with auditor’s 
role behavior in Ukrainian central government makes those prescriptions impracticable. As was 
stated before, in practice, the majority of auditors in Ukrainian central government are 
performing control and inspection roles. Therefore, there is a role conflict as roles have an 
incompatible nature. It is impossible for auditors to improve system of internal control, while 
performing control themselves. Auditors do not evaluate the effectiveness of the anti-corruption 
policies at the institution and institutional functioning in general, focusing on the search of 
violations and their elimination.  
The performance auditing occupies low percentage of audit activities held at the Ukrainian 
central government, therefore, it can be argued that the performance auditing, as a tool, is not 
used for its purposes and does not provide enough benefit in prevention and reduction of 
corruption. Moreover, there is a lack in staffing and auditor’s competence to combat corruption, 
the recommendations of auditors are not expected by management and are not listened and 
further implemented.  
The lack of independence is the next factor, which holds auditors from preventing and 
reducing corruption. As stated by Wildavsky (1979), the separation between the agent and the 
auditing agency is central for oversight mechanism not to work primarily as a self-evaluation 
function. Gustavson & Sundström (2016) have included it as one of the three main principles 
that can be regarded as essential elements in a definition of good auditing. As stated in 
Gustavson & Sundström (2016) research, there is a risk that self-estimations will overvalue 
performance and downplay underperformance and other problems in the organisation due to 
management’s desire to present a picture of success (Meier et al., 2015). Additionally, as 
presented in the empirical findings of this thesis, some institutions can benefit from being 







The aim of this thesis was to understand the roles performed by public sector auditors and 
how those new roles can prevent and reduce corruption in Ukraine. To achieve the presented 
results, qualitative study based on role theory proposed by Kahn et al. (1964) and Katz & Kahn 
(1978) was conducted. Data collection is based on semi-structured interviews conducted among 
15 experienced auditors in public sector in Ukraine, as well as on documental analysis.  
The discrepancies between the legal framework and auditor’s perceptions made the research 
process more complicated, but also fruitful. Legal framework assigns auditors with the role, 
which corresponds with international standards and reflect the performance auditing 
perspective. However, the perception of auditors and information obtained from the Ministry 
of Finances provided me with the real picture of the public sector auditing in Ukraine. 
This thesis contributes to the public sector auditing research with the unexplored case of a 
post-soviet country and sheds lights on the impact of the public sector auditing on corruption. 
The thesis is coherent to the previous research related to the Ukrainian context by Slobodianyk 
(2008),  Bardash (2010), Maksimova & Slobodianyk (2014), Skorba (2015), Konovalov (2015), 
Nevidomyi (2016), Pikhotskiy (2016), Maksymenko & Melikhova (2017), Makarenko (2017), 
Grytsyshen & Nazarenko (2018), Novikona et al. (2018), Gurzhii et al. (2019), Slobodianyk et 
al. (2019). 
The research showed that there is a general lack in understanding of the public sector 
auditor’s role. This leads to the role stress and inability of auditors to enact their new role. 
Therefore, the quality of the auditing does not prevent and reduce corruption, as it should. 
Practical contribution of the research is seen in the increased awareness of the public sector 
actors about the role of public sector auditors in order to promote the real shift in roles. As the 
result, it is expected that better auditing and improved systems functioning will combat 
corruption more effectively.  
 
What is the role of public sector auditors in Ukrainian central government? 
Previous public sector accounting research was useful to provide with innovative perception 
about auditors and their roles, enabled with the performance auditing introduction. It is argued 
that auditors are no longer deemed as “watchdogs” and have a much wider scope of duties and 
opportunities.  
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Ukraine goes hand in hand with world trends by reforming public sector in various areas. 
Therefore, the roles of auditors in Ukrainian central government were changed significantly 
with the development of the new regulatory framework. The new roles that auditors are 
expected to perform are advisory, protection and guidance. However, the research identified 
that there is not a real shift and auditors in Ukraine still perform traditional role as institutional 
inspectors. Therefore, there is no compliance between the current legal as well as regulatory 
framework governing public administration in Ukraine and real situation. 
The research based on the role theory indicated the role stress that auditors are experiencing 
in the form of two different role conflicts: the inter-sender and intra-sender. Analysis reveals 
that managers place expectations on auditors to perform the inspection role, while the legal 
framework calls for the traditional role withdrawal. Such factors as role stress, organisational 
environment (structure), skills and competencies, number of staff and lack of independence – 
makes auditors unable to enact their new advisory-like role.  
This study contributes to the previous research on public sector auditing, which argues about 
a need to establish the specific context in which internal auditors are required to operate (Ahmad 
and Taylor, 2009). Overall, the findings suggest that changes are needed in hanging the 
environment surrounding the IAF, since analysis shows that the above-mentioned factors have 
a greater impact on the role behaviors of public sector auditors than the legal environment.  
There is also the lack of political will to listen to auditors’ recommendations and reform the 
public sector to prevent corruption, supporting the study of Klitgaard (2006). Therefore, it is 
crucial to ensure the independence of auditors and change in management perception about the 
role of the public sector auditors.  
   
How public sector auditors could prevent and reduce corruption in Ukraine? 
There are two ways in which public sector auditors can prevent and reduce corruption. The 
first one is seen in recognising indicators or “red flags” of corruption in the official documents 
of public sector institutions and provide recommendations to combat those corrupt practices 
(Khan, 2006; Albrecht et al., 2012; Ministry of Finance, 2019). However, the corruption will 
still appear, forcing involved in the corrupt practices actors to hide it better. Therefore, it is 
more linked with the prevention and reduction of corruption for the limited period of time, with 
its further appearance and grows within institution.  
58 
The second way is based on the creation on the environment with “zero-tolerance” towards 
corruption. The contribution of public sector audit should be mainly seen in the context of 
building integrity, spreading an anti-corruption culture, and sustaining an environment without 
corruption. In accordance with applicable law and generally accepted international standards, 
audit activity should be mainly focused on the analysis and assessment of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the internal control system (Ministry of Finance, 2019). Therefore, the 
effectiveness of this tool is seen primarily in its ability to combat corruption permanently by 
ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector (Khan, 2006; Otalor & Eiya, 2013; 
Reding et al., 2013; Jeppesen, 2019).  
Research identified that role behavior of public sector auditors affects how effectively 
institution can combat corruption. Performance audit contributes to compliance with the 
principles of effectiveness, efficiency and economy in the allocation of the institution’s 
resources. The ability of the public sector auditors to correctly identify and assess the risks and 
to formulate clear recommendations to reduce them is one of the most important factors in the 
success of the reforms in the public sector.  
However, the case of Ukrainian central government shows that traditional “watchdog” role 
of auditors is not effective in achieving tangible result. Auditors with sufficient knowledge can 
identify corruption “red flags”, however, the system will continue to enable corruption 
appearance. The organisational environment should be adjusted for the performance by auditors 
of the roles, assigned to them at the legal framework. Those are advisory, protection and 
guidance, which together may result in “zero-tolerance” to corruption environment with 
effective governance, risk management and internal control.  
 
Limitation  
The research design of this project has some limitations. The scope of this study is limited 
to the case study of Ukrainian central government. The findings may therefore not necessarily 
be directly applicable to other contexts, therefore, comparative studies with other Eastern 
Europe countries are needed. The method and the questionnaire can be used in future research 
for empirically exploring the role of public sector auditors and corruption in other contexts.  
Due to time limitations and pandemic of COVID-19, some informants have cancelled 
agreed interviews. In total, empirical findings are based on information from 15 (fifteen) 
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auditors. It would have been better to include perceptions of more public sector auditors, but I 
am convinced that for my topic, enough representation is retained.  
 
Further research  
Very little research has been conducted on the IAF, a wide range of questions still need to 
be explored. In order to improve our knowledge and understanding of internal auditing and 
governance, it is important to conduct further research on expectations and the relations 
between internal auditors and other governance mechanisms, particularly the audit committee, 
the board of directors, top management and external auditors (Roussy, 2013).  
As the case study of Ukrainian central government showed, auditors are acting under the 
pressure of senior management, the question arises if auditors are independent as they should 
be and how to ensure their independence. Consequently, the issue of public sector auditors’ 
independence requires further research.  
The comparison analysis on the case of other post-soviet countries/developing/countries 
with transitional economies on the roles of public sector auditors will provide literature with 
interesting discussion about the performance auditing and its impact in the public sector, as well 
as widen the role theory with new evidences of role senders, expectations and role behavior of 
public sector auditors. This will also contribute to the understanding of the role of auditors in 
preventing and reducing corruption.  
Moreover, as this research present data about the SAI in Ukraine and finds that performance 
audits are claimed to be highly developed during the last decades with the present role 
ambiguity. More research is needed to understand whether SAI’s performance audits really lead 
to adoption of reforms, improvement in effectiveness and efficiency, development of the good 
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Respondents search process 
The search of respondents was organised through email. Email addresses were found at the 
official websites of governmental institutions.  
The following message was sent to the SAI auditors: 
My name is Tamara Volodina, I am a 2nd year master’s student of the double degree 
program of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in Ukraine and Nord University in 
Norway.  
I am conducting a master's project on the topic: “Governmental financial control and audit 
in ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector in Ukraine”. For a high-quality 
master's research, I need to conduct an interview with representatives of the (ACU, SAS). 
Respondents may be from different departments and positions. 
Kindly asking you to help with search of the respondent who can answer my questions 
(please find attached). The interview will last approximately 30-40 minutes. If you wish, your 
contact details will not be listed in the study, and anonymity of your personal data is guaranteed. 
I am also attaching official letter from university. Thank you in advance! 
 
The following message was sent to the internal auditors: 
My name is Tamara Volodina, I am a 2nd year master’s student of the double degree 
program of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in Ukraine and Nord University in 
Norway.  
I am conducting a master's project on the topic: “Governmental financial control and audit 
in ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector in Ukraine”. For a high-quality 
master's research, I need to conduct an interview with an official of the Internal Audit 
Department at the (governmental institution).  
Kindly asking you to help with search of the respondent who can answer my questions 
(please find attached). The interview will last approximately 30-40 minutes. If you wish, your 
contact details will not be listed in the study, and anonymity of your personal data is guaranteed. 
Thank you in advance! 
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Appendix 2. 
Interview Guide for the external auditors 
This interview is aimed at gathering information for my Master's thesis project research. 
The aim of the study is to get a general overview about the role of public sector auditors in 
Ukrainian central government and to identify how public sector audit could prevent and reduce 
corruption in Ukraine. Thank you for your time and help! 
Performance auditing  
1. Can you give your opinion about the state of the public sector auditing in Ukraine? Do 
you think that it is already framed? If no, what is missing? 
2. Who are the main actors in PA in Ukraine? What are their roles? How do they interact 
with each other? 
3. How the role of public sector auditors changed? When did it happen and why? Is there 
a shift from “watchdog” to the advisory role?  
4. Who are conducting performance auditing in Ukraine? Are there any special department 
and courses for performance auditors? Based on your experience, which skills are 
necessary for performance auditors? 
5. What other challenges connected with public sector auditing in Ukraine have you faced? 
What would you like to add regarding performance auditing in Ukraine? 
Corruption  
6. In which way public sector audit can prevent and reduce corruption in Ukraine? How 
auditors can fight with corruption, if it normally conceals any trace in the official 
records? 
7. Do you think that public sector auditing is an effective tool to prevent and combat 
corruption more effectively?  
8. Can auditors see the “red flags” (indicators or symptoms of fraud)? Which red flags can 
you highlight? How should those be treated and presented in reports?  
9. Could you please add other information on how public sector audit could prevent and 





Interview Guide for the internal auditors 
This interview is aimed at gathering information for my Master's thesis project research. 
The aim of the study is to get a general overview about the role of public sector auditors in 
Ukrainian central government and to identify how public sector audit could prevent and reduce 
corruption in Ukraine. Thank you for your time and help! 
Performance auditing  
1. Can you give your opinion about the state of the public sector auditing in Ukraine? Do 
you think that it is already framed? If no, what is missing? 
2. Who are the main actors in PA in Ukraine? What are their roles? How do they interact 
with each other? 
3. How the role of public sector auditors changed? When did it happen and why? Is there 
a shift from “watchdog” to the advisory role?  
4. Which role public sector auditors should perform? Is it the same in practice? 
5. How results of the performance audits are implemented at (institution)? Are you 
following the recommendations of auditors? How this process is organised and 
controlled? Are those recommendations professional and effective?  
6. Do you think that performance auditing can improve the performance of (institution)? 
Please explain your answer. 
7. What other challenges connected with public sector auditing in Ukraine have you faced? 
What would you like to add regarding performance auditing in Ukraine? 
Corruption 
8. Do you know which anti-corruption measures are being carried out at (the institution), 
by whom they were initiated? If yes, please describe them. 
9. In your opinion, how public sector audit can prevent and reduce corruption in Ukraine?  
10. Do you think that public sector auditing is an effective tool to prevent and combat 
corruption more effectively?  
11. Have you received indicators or symptoms of fraud from auditors? Which actions were 
undertaken? Was is useful in detecting corruption particularly for your institution? 
12. Could you please add other information on how public sector audit could prevent and 
reduce corruption in Ukraine? 
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Appendix 3.  
Respondents 






Deputy Director of the 
Department for the Use of 
the State Budget in the 
Regions 
Meeting ACU auditor 1 
2. Head of the Department for 
Adaptation and 
Implementation of 
International Standards for 
International Cooperation 
Meeting ACU auditor 2 
3. Anonymous Phone call ACU auditor 3 
4. Anonymous Phone call ACU auditor 4 




North Office, Head of the 
Department  
Meeting SAS auditor 
6. External 
auditor 
Director of the Center for 
Advanced Studies of 
National university of Kuiv 
Meeting External auditor 1 
7. External 
auditor 
Board member of the Audit 
Chamber of Ukraine 
Phone call External auditor 2 








Chairman of the Federation 
Council 
Phone call External auditor 3 
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Head of department 
Internal Auditor 
Meeting Internal auditor 1 




Internal Auditor Phone call Internal auditor 2 







Head of Internal Audit 
Department 
Phone call Internal auditor 3 
12. Anonymous Internal auditor  Phone call Internal auditor 4 







Chief specialist of the 
internal audit sector 
Phone call Internal auditor 5 
14. Kyiv City 
Council 
Chief Specialist of the Audit 
Department of the Budgeting 
Institutions of the Internal 
Control and Audit 
Department 
Phone call Internal auditor 6 
15. Kyiv City 
Council 
Chief Specialist of the Audit 
Department of the Budgeting 
Institutions of the Internal 
Control and Audit 
Department 
Phone call Internal auditor 7 




Appendix 4.  
Anti-corruption bodies in Ukraine 
 Institution Status Normative Scope 







offenses within its 
jurisdiction as well as 
with avoiding the 











- investigation of corruption in 
the highest bodies of authority 
and systemic corruption 
threatening national security;  
- investigation of instances of 
fraudulent misrepresentation of 
information in the declaration;  
- investigation of crimes in 
which the amount of damage 
caused to the state, the 
community, or an enterprise 
exceeds 500 minimum wages; 
- investigation of bribing of 
foreign officials. 
2. SAPO Independent 
structural unit of the 
Prosecutor General’s 
Office of Ukraine, 
which is subordinate 
exclusively to the 
Deputy Prosecutor 
General – Head of 
the Specialized Anti-
Corruption 













- procedural guidance of 
investigations conducted by the 
National Anti-Corruption 
Bureau of Ukraine;  
- supervision of the observance 
of laws during investigative 
operations and pretrial 
investigations conducted by the 
NABU;  
- bringing public charges in 
criminal proceedings 
investigated by the NABU;  
- representation of the interests 
of a citizen or of the State in 
court in cases involving 
corruption or corruption-related 
offenses, as specified by the Law 
“On the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office.” 
3. NACP Special-status central 
executive agency 












- formation of the state anti-
corruption policy and its 
implementation;  
- verification of declarations; 
- monitoring of public servants’ 
lifestyle;  
- control over observation of 
anti-corruption restrictions and 
requirements imposed by the 
legislation (plurality of offices, 
conflict of interests, gifts, etc.); 
- control over political parties’ 
financing;  
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- anti-corruption examination;  
- cooperation with and 
protection of informers;  
- drawing up administrative 
reports on corruption offenses. 
4. HACC High Anti-








June 7, 2018 
- Jurisdiction of the NABU 





state policy on the 
detection and search 
of assets which may 
be arrested or 
confiscated under a 
criminal case and/or 
on the management 
of assets arrested or 



















- implementing measures to 
detect, trace, and evaluate assets 
upon request of an investigator, 
detective, prosecutor, or court 
(investigating judge);  
- organisation of implementation 
of measures relating to 
evaluation, accounting and 
management of assets;  
- maintenance of the Unified 
State Register of Assets Arrested 























- investigation of a wide range of 
crimes, including corruption 
offenses other than those under 
NABU jurisdiction; 
- investigation of crimes 
committed by high-level 
officials and law enforcement 
officers, except for crimes under 
NABU jurisdiction; 
- investigation of crimes 
committed by officers of the 
NABU and of the SAPO, except 
or crimes under NABU 
jurisdiction; 






agency that serves 
society by ensuring 
protection of human 





July 2, 2015 
- investigation of corruption 
crimes other than those under 
NABU or SBI jurisdiction;  










Special purpose state 
law enforcement 































Appendix 5.  
 
Selected Internet secondary data gateways and archives 
Name Internet address Comment 
General focus 
Google Scholar  https://scholar.google.com/ A free web search for links 
to articles and textbooks 
Ukrainian legislation https://www.rada.gov.ua/ Official portal of the 
Ukrainian Parliament – 
Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine 
ACU  https://rp.gov.ua/home/ Official website of the 
Ukrainian SAI 
Statistics http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ Official website of the State 
statistics service of Ukraine 
Central government  https://www.kmu.gov.ua/catalog Official website of 
Ukrainian Government, 
catalogue to all the bodies 
Cabinet of Ministers https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en Government portal 
Ministry of Finance of 
Ukraine 
https://mof.gov.ua/en/news Official website of the 
Ministry of Finance of 
Ukraine 
Source: constructed by the author. 
 
